Files
irtt-rs/crates/irtt-client/src/session/machine.rs
T

1136 lines
39 KiB
Rust

use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use irtt_proto::{
decode_echo_reply, echo_packet_len, encode_request, flags, Clock, EchoReply, OpenReply, Params,
RequestToEncode, ServerFill, TimestampFields, PROTOCOL_VERSION,
};
use crate::{
config::{
ClientConfig, RunMode, MAX_DSCP_CODEPOINT, MAX_SERVER_FILL_BYTES, MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_LENGTH,
},
error::ClientError,
event::{
ClientEvent, OneWayDelaySample, OpenOutcome, ReceivedStatsSample, RttSample, ServerTiming,
SignedDuration, WarningKind,
},
metadata::ReceiveMeta,
probe::{CompletedSet, PendingMap, PendingProbe, TimedOutMap},
session::{negotiate_params, NegotiatedParams},
socket_options::dscp_codepoint_to_traffic_class,
timing::ClientTimestamp,
};
pub(crate) const MAX_OPEN_PACKET_SIZE: usize = 512;
const MIN_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = 2048;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct SessionMachine {
config: ClientConfig,
remote: std::net::SocketAddr,
requested: Params,
state: MachineState,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
enum MachineState {
Connected,
Open(Box<ActiveSession>),
NoTestCompleted,
Closed {
source: CloseSource,
packets_sent: u64,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum CloseSource {
Local,
Peer,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct ActiveSession {
token: u64,
negotiated: NegotiatedParams,
local_close_packet: Box<[u8]>,
next_wire_seq: u32,
highest_received_seq: Option<u32>,
packets_sent: u64,
pending: PendingMap,
timed_out: TimedOutMap,
completed: CompletedSet,
kernel_tx_correlation_valid: bool,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct PreparedOpenRequest {
pub(crate) bytes: Box<[u8]>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) enum OpenDatagramDisposition {
Ignore,
Trusted(OpenReply),
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct PreparedOpenAcceptance {
next_state: MachineState,
outcome: OpenOutcome,
}
impl PreparedOpenAcceptance {
pub(crate) fn normal_negotiated(&self) -> Option<&NegotiatedParams> {
match &self.next_state {
MachineState::Open(session) => Some(&session.negotiated),
_ => None,
}
}
pub(crate) fn cleanup_close_packet(&self) -> Option<&[u8]> {
match &self.next_state {
MachineState::Open(session) => Some(&session.local_close_packet),
_ => None,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct PreparedClose<'a> {
pub(crate) bytes: &'a [u8],
pub(crate) commit: CloseCommit,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct CloseCommit {
packets_sent: u64,
token: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct OpenAcceptanceFailure {
pub(crate) primary: ClientError,
pub(crate) cleanup_close: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
}
impl OpenAcceptanceFailure {
fn new(primary: ClientError, cleanup_close: Option<Box<[u8]>>) -> Self {
Self {
primary,
cleanup_close,
}
}
fn without_cleanup(primary: ClientError) -> Self {
Self::new(primary, None)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct PreparedProbe {
pub(crate) bytes: Box<[u8]>,
pub(crate) seq: u32,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct ProbeCommitPreflight {
seq: u32,
next_wire_seq: u32,
pub(crate) next_packets_sent: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct ProbeCommit {
wire_seq: u32,
/// Operational timeout deadline, derived from the pre-send send anchor.
/// See [`PendingProbe::timeout_at`].
timeout_at: Instant,
/// Pre-send wall-clock lower bound for kernel TX plausibility. See
/// [`PendingProbe::tx_not_before_wall`].
tx_not_before_wall: SystemTime,
next_wire_seq: u32,
next_packets_sent: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct TimeoutBatch {
pub events: Vec<ClientEvent>,
pub more_due: bool,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub(crate) struct ProbeSent {
pub(crate) seq: u32,
pub(crate) sent_at: ClientTimestamp,
pub(crate) bytes: usize,
}
impl SessionMachine {
pub(crate) fn new(
config: ClientConfig,
remote: std::net::SocketAddr,
) -> Result<Self, ClientError> {
Self::validate_config(&config)?;
let requested = params_from_config(&config)?;
Ok(Self {
config,
remote,
requested,
state: MachineState::Connected,
})
}
pub(crate) fn validate_config(config: &ClientConfig) -> Result<(), ClientError> {
if config.max_pending_probes == 0 {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: "max_pending_probes must be greater than zero".to_owned(),
});
}
if config.probe_timeout == Duration::ZERO {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: "probe_timeout must be greater than zero".to_owned(),
});
}
params_from_config(config).map(|_| ())
}
pub(crate) fn config(&self) -> &ClientConfig {
&self.config
}
pub(crate) fn has_hmac(&self) -> bool {
self.config.hmac_key.is_some()
}
pub(crate) fn prepare_open_request(&self) -> Result<PreparedOpenRequest, ClientError> {
self.ensure_connected()?;
let bytes = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Open {
params: &self.requested,
no_test: self.config.run_mode == RunMode::NoTest,
},
self.config.hmac_key.as_deref(),
)?;
Ok(PreparedOpenRequest {
bytes: bytes.into_boxed_slice(),
})
}
pub(crate) fn inspect_open_datagram(
&self,
packet: &[u8],
) -> Result<OpenDatagramDisposition, ClientError> {
self.ensure_connected()?;
match irtt_proto::decode_open_reply(packet, self.config.hmac_key.as_deref()) {
Ok(reply) => Ok(OpenDatagramDisposition::Trusted(reply)),
Err(error @ irtt_proto::ProtoError::ZeroToken) => Err(ClientError::Protocol(error)),
Err(
error @ (irtt_proto::ProtoError::TruncatedVarint
| irtt_proto::ProtoError::VarintOverflow
| irtt_proto::ProtoError::InvalidUtf8
| irtt_proto::ProtoError::InvalidEnum { .. }
| irtt_proto::ProtoError::ParameterLengthTooLarge { .. }
| irtt_proto::ProtoError::MalformedParams),
) => Err(ClientError::Protocol(error)),
Err(_) => Ok(OpenDatagramDisposition::Ignore),
}
}
pub(crate) fn prepare_open_acceptance(
&self,
reply: OpenReply,
now: ClientTimestamp,
) -> Result<PreparedOpenAcceptance, OpenAcceptanceFailure> {
self.ensure_connected()
.map_err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::without_cleanup)?;
let reply_is_close = flags::has(reply.flags, flags::FLAG_CLOSE);
let cleanup_close = if !reply_is_close && reply.token != 0 {
let bytes = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Close { token: reply.token },
self.config.hmac_key.as_deref(),
)
.map_err(ClientError::from)
.map_err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::without_cleanup)?;
Some(bytes.into_boxed_slice())
} else {
None
};
if reply.params.protocol_version != PROTOCOL_VERSION {
return Err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::new(
ClientError::ProtocolVersionMismatch {
requested: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
received: reply.params.protocol_version,
},
cleanup_close,
));
}
match self.config.run_mode {
RunMode::Normal if reply_is_close => Err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::new(
ClientError::ServerRejected,
cleanup_close,
)),
RunMode::Normal if reply.token == 0 => Err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::new(
ClientError::ZeroToken,
cleanup_close,
)),
RunMode::Normal => self.prepare_normal_open(reply, now, cleanup_close),
RunMode::NoTest if !reply_is_close => Err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::new(
ClientError::UnexpectedNoTestReply,
cleanup_close,
)),
RunMode::NoTest if reply.token != 0 => Err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::new(
ClientError::NonZeroNoTestToken { token: reply.token },
cleanup_close,
)),
RunMode::NoTest => self.prepare_no_test_open(reply, now),
}
}
pub(crate) fn commit_open(&mut self, prepared: PreparedOpenAcceptance) -> OpenOutcome {
debug_assert!(
matches!(self.state, MachineState::Connected),
"open acceptance commits only from connected state"
);
self.state = prepared.next_state;
prepared.outcome
}
pub(crate) fn probe_timeout(&self) -> Duration {
self.config.probe_timeout
}
pub(crate) fn prepare_probe(&self) -> Result<PreparedProbe, ClientError> {
let session = self.open_session()?;
let bytes = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Echo {
token: session.token,
sequence: session.next_wire_seq,
params: &session.negotiated.params,
payload: &[],
},
self.config.hmac_key.as_deref(),
)?;
Ok(PreparedProbe {
bytes: bytes.into_boxed_slice(),
seq: session.next_wire_seq,
})
}
pub(crate) fn preflight_probe_commit(
&mut self,
prepared: &PreparedProbe,
) -> Result<ProbeCommitPreflight, ClientError> {
let session = self.open_session_mut()?;
if prepared.seq != session.next_wire_seq {
return Err(ClientError::StalePreparedProbe {
prepared_seq: prepared.seq,
next_wire_seq: session.next_wire_seq,
});
}
session.pending.preflight_insert(prepared.seq)?;
let next_packets_sent =
session
.packets_sent
.checked_add(1)
.ok_or(ClientError::CounterOverflow {
counter: "packets_sent",
})?;
Ok(ProbeCommitPreflight {
seq: prepared.seq,
next_wire_seq: prepared.seq.wrapping_add(1),
next_packets_sent,
})
}
/// Finalizes all fallible probe-commit preflight work that must happen
/// before the socket send: the timeout deadline arithmetic (which can
/// overflow) and capturing the pre-send wall-clock lower bound used to
/// validate a later asynchronous kernel TX timestamp.
///
/// `send_anchor` is a *private* pre-send timestamp, not the public
/// measurement `sent_at` — it is sampled immediately before this call,
/// before the socket send. Its `mono` field anchors the operational
/// timeout deadline and its `wall` field becomes
/// [`PendingProbe::tx_not_before_wall`]. See the client crate's
/// `AGENTS.md` for why timeout semantics deliberately stay pre-send
/// anchored while the public `sent_at` measurement moves after the send.
pub(crate) fn finalize_probe_commit(
&self,
preflight: ProbeCommitPreflight,
send_anchor: ClientTimestamp,
) -> Result<ProbeCommit, ClientError> {
let timeout_at = send_anchor
.mono
.checked_add(self.config.probe_timeout)
.ok_or(ClientError::DurationOverflow)?;
Ok(ProbeCommit {
wire_seq: preflight.seq,
timeout_at,
tx_not_before_wall: send_anchor.wall,
next_wire_seq: preflight.next_wire_seq,
next_packets_sent: preflight.next_packets_sent,
})
}
/// Infallibly commits a probe as sent, using the post-send measurement
/// `sent_at` captured immediately after the successful socket send
/// returned. All fallible work already happened in
/// [`Self::finalize_probe_commit`]; nothing here can fail.
pub(crate) fn commit_probe_sent(
&mut self,
commit: ProbeCommit,
sent_at: ClientTimestamp,
bytes: usize,
) -> ProbeSent {
let session = match &mut self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => session,
_ => unreachable!("probe commits are only created for an open session"),
};
let seq = commit.wire_seq;
let pending = PendingProbe {
wire_seq: seq,
sent_at,
timeout_at: commit.timeout_at,
tx_not_before_wall: commit.tx_not_before_wall,
kernel_tx_timestamp: None,
};
session.timed_out.remove(seq);
session.completed.remove(seq);
session.pending.commit_insert(pending);
session.next_wire_seq = commit.next_wire_seq;
session.packets_sent = commit.next_packets_sent;
ProbeSent {
seq,
sent_at,
bytes,
}
}
/// Disable Linux kernel TX timestamp correlation after a probe send fails.
///
/// A failed submission can consume a kernel `SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID`
/// without advancing the wire sequence. Existing associated timestamps
/// remain valid observations; later error-queue timestamps cannot be
/// associated safely and are ignored for the rest of this session.
pub(crate) fn invalidate_kernel_tx_correlation(&mut self) {
if let MachineState::Open(session) = &mut self.state {
session.kernel_tx_correlation_valid = false;
}
}
/// Record an observed Linux kernel TX timestamp for `wire_seq`, the
/// automatic `SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID` the kernel assigned when the
/// datagram was submitted.
///
/// `wire_seq` normally matches that correlation ID after successful
/// sends. This is best effort rather than an invariant: a kernel ID can
/// theoretically be consumed by a send that later fails, leaving the
/// counters desynchronized. An unmatched or implausible ID is discarded;
/// the probe's userspace `sent_at` remains the fallback.
///
/// Updates a still-pending or already-timed-out probe in place. Never
/// resurrects a completed, evicted, or unknown probe, and never touches
/// `sent_at`, timeout/loss/reply state, or any counter — this is purely
/// dormant metadata attachment. A probe that already has a timestamp
/// keeps it: first usable observation wins, so a later duplicate cannot
/// silently overwrite it.
pub(crate) fn record_kernel_tx_timestamp(&mut self, wire_seq: u32, timestamp: SystemTime) {
let MachineState::Open(session) = &mut self.state else {
return;
};
if !session.kernel_tx_correlation_valid {
return;
}
if let Some(probe) = session.pending.get_mut(wire_seq) {
probe.kernel_tx_timestamp.get_or_insert(timestamp);
return;
}
if let Some(probe) = session.timed_out.get_mut(wire_seq) {
probe.kernel_tx_timestamp.get_or_insert(timestamp);
}
}
pub(crate) fn process_received_echo_packet(
&mut self,
packet: &[u8],
now: ClientTimestamp,
meta: ReceiveMeta,
) -> Result<Vec<ClientEvent>, ClientError> {
self.open_session()?;
let Some(reply) = self.decode_received_packet(packet) else {
return Ok(vec![ClientEvent::Warning {
kind: WarningKind::MalformedOrUnrelatedPacket,
message: "dropped malformed or unrelated packet".to_owned(),
at: now,
}]);
};
self.process_echo_reply(reply, packet.len(), now, meta)
}
pub(crate) fn poll_timeouts_at(
&mut self,
now: Instant,
) -> Result<Vec<ClientEvent>, ClientError> {
let batch = self.poll_timeouts_bounded_at(now, usize::MAX)?;
debug_assert!(!batch.more_due);
Ok(batch.events)
}
pub(crate) fn poll_timeouts_bounded_at(
&mut self,
now: Instant,
limit: usize,
) -> Result<TimeoutBatch, ClientError> {
let session = self.open_session_mut()?;
let expired = session.pending.drain_expired_bounded(now, limit);
let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(expired.probes.len());
for probe in expired.probes {
events.push(ClientEvent::EchoLoss {
seq: probe.wire_seq,
sent_at: probe.sent_at,
timeout_at: probe.timeout_at,
});
session.timed_out.insert(probe);
}
Ok(TimeoutBatch {
events,
more_due: expired.more_due,
})
}
pub(crate) fn prepare_close(&self) -> Result<PreparedClose<'_>, ClientError> {
let session = self.open_session()?;
Ok(PreparedClose {
bytes: &session.local_close_packet,
commit: CloseCommit {
packets_sent: session.packets_sent,
token: session.token,
},
})
}
pub(crate) fn commit_local_close(
&mut self,
commit: CloseCommit,
sent_at: ClientTimestamp,
) -> ClientEvent {
debug_assert!(
matches!(self.state, MachineState::Open(_)),
"local close commits only from open state"
);
self.state = MachineState::Closed {
source: CloseSource::Local,
packets_sent: commit.packets_sent,
};
ClientEvent::SessionClosed {
remote: self.remote,
token: commit.token,
at: sent_at,
}
}
pub(crate) fn negotiated_params(&self) -> Option<&NegotiatedParams> {
match &self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => Some(&session.negotiated),
_ => None,
}
}
pub(crate) fn pending_is_empty(&self) -> bool {
match &self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => session.pending.is_empty(),
_ => true,
}
}
pub(crate) fn is_peer_closed(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self.state,
MachineState::Closed {
source: CloseSource::Peer,
..
}
)
}
pub(crate) fn packets_sent(&self) -> u64 {
match &self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => session.packets_sent,
MachineState::Closed { packets_sent, .. } => *packets_sent,
MachineState::Connected | MachineState::NoTestCompleted => 0,
}
}
pub(crate) fn next_probe_timeout_deadline(&self) -> Option<Instant> {
match &self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => session.pending.next_timeout_deadline(),
_ => None,
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "tokio")]
pub(crate) fn latest_probe_timeout_deadline(&self) -> Option<Instant> {
match &self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => session
.pending
.latest_timeout_deadline()
.into_iter()
.chain(session.timed_out.latest_timeout_deadline())
.max(),
_ => None,
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "tokio")]
pub(crate) fn ensure_open(&self) -> Result<(), ClientError> {
self.open_session().map(|_| ())
}
fn prepare_normal_open(
&self,
reply: OpenReply,
now: ClientTimestamp,
cleanup_close: Option<Box<[u8]>>,
) -> Result<PreparedOpenAcceptance, OpenAcceptanceFailure> {
let token = reply.token;
let negotiated = match negotiate_params(
&self.requested,
reply.params,
self.config.negotiation_policy,
) {
Ok(negotiated) => negotiated,
Err(primary) => return Err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::new(primary, cleanup_close)),
};
let local_close_packet =
cleanup_close.expect("normal non-zero-token replies prepare a cleanup close");
let next_state = MachineState::Open(Box::new(ActiveSession {
token,
negotiated: negotiated.clone(),
local_close_packet,
next_wire_seq: 0,
highest_received_seq: None,
packets_sent: 0,
pending: PendingMap::new(self.config.max_pending_probes),
timed_out: TimedOutMap::new(self.config.max_pending_probes),
completed: CompletedSet::new(self.config.max_pending_probes),
kernel_tx_correlation_valid: true,
}));
let event = ClientEvent::SessionStarted {
remote: self.remote,
token,
negotiated: negotiated.clone(),
at: now,
};
let outcome = OpenOutcome::Started {
remote: self.remote,
token,
negotiated,
event,
};
Ok(PreparedOpenAcceptance {
next_state,
outcome,
})
}
fn prepare_no_test_open(
&self,
reply: OpenReply,
now: ClientTimestamp,
) -> Result<PreparedOpenAcceptance, OpenAcceptanceFailure> {
let negotiated = negotiate_params(
&self.requested,
reply.params,
self.config.negotiation_policy,
)
.map_err(OpenAcceptanceFailure::without_cleanup)?;
let event = ClientEvent::NoTestCompleted {
remote: self.remote,
negotiated: negotiated.clone(),
at: now,
};
let outcome = OpenOutcome::NoTestCompleted {
remote: self.remote,
negotiated,
event,
};
Ok(PreparedOpenAcceptance {
next_state: MachineState::NoTestCompleted,
outcome,
})
}
fn decode_received_packet(&self, packet: &[u8]) -> Option<EchoReply> {
let session = self
.open_session()
.expect("decode_received_packet is only called for an open session");
decode_echo_reply(
packet,
&session.negotiated.params,
self.config.hmac_key.as_deref(),
)
.ok()
}
fn process_echo_reply(
&mut self,
reply: EchoReply,
packet_len: usize,
now: ClientTimestamp,
meta: ReceiveMeta,
) -> Result<Vec<ClientEvent>, ClientError> {
let token = self
.open_session()
.expect("process_echo_reply is only called for an open session")
.token;
if reply.token != token {
return Ok(vec![ClientEvent::Warning {
kind: WarningKind::WrongToken,
message: format!(
"dropped reply with wrong token: expected {token:#x}, got {:#x}",
reply.token
),
at: now,
}]);
}
let wire_seq = reply.sequence;
let should_close = flags::has(reply.flags, flags::FLAG_CLOSE);
let mut events = {
let session = self
.open_session_mut()
.expect("process_echo_reply is only called for an open session");
if let Some(pending) = session.pending.remove(wire_seq) {
let rtt = compute_rtt(&pending.sent_at, &now, &reply.timestamps);
let server_timing = build_server_timing(&reply.timestamps);
let one_way = compute_one_way(
&pending.sent_at,
pending.tx_not_before_wall,
&now,
pending.kernel_tx_timestamp,
&meta,
&reply.timestamps,
);
let received_stats = build_received_stats(&reply);
let is_late = session
.highest_received_seq
.is_some_and(|h| sequence_is_before(wire_seq, h));
let highest_seen = session.highest_received_seq.unwrap_or(wire_seq);
update_highest_received(&mut session.highest_received_seq, wire_seq);
session.completed.insert(wire_seq);
if is_late {
vec![ClientEvent::LateReply {
seq: wire_seq,
highest_seen,
remote: self.remote,
sent_at: Some(pending.sent_at),
received_at: now,
rtt: Some(rtt),
server_timing,
one_way,
received_stats,
bytes: packet_len,
packet_meta: meta.into(),
}]
} else {
vec![ClientEvent::EchoReply {
seq: wire_seq,
remote: self.remote,
sent_at: pending.sent_at,
received_at: now,
rtt,
server_timing,
one_way,
received_stats,
bytes: packet_len,
packet_meta: meta.into(),
}]
}
} else if session.completed.contains(wire_seq) {
update_highest_received(&mut session.highest_received_seq, wire_seq);
vec![ClientEvent::DuplicateReply {
seq: wire_seq,
remote: self.remote,
received_at: now,
bytes: packet_len,
}]
} else if let Some(timed_out) = session.timed_out.remove(wire_seq) {
let rtt = compute_rtt(&timed_out.sent_at, &now, &reply.timestamps);
let server_timing = build_server_timing(&reply.timestamps);
let one_way = compute_one_way(
&timed_out.sent_at,
timed_out.tx_not_before_wall,
&now,
timed_out.kernel_tx_timestamp,
&meta,
&reply.timestamps,
);
let received_stats = build_received_stats(&reply);
let highest_seen = session.highest_received_seq.unwrap_or(wire_seq);
update_highest_received(&mut session.highest_received_seq, wire_seq);
session.completed.insert(wire_seq);
vec![ClientEvent::LateReply {
seq: wire_seq,
highest_seen,
remote: self.remote,
sent_at: Some(timed_out.sent_at),
received_at: now,
rtt: Some(rtt),
server_timing,
one_way,
received_stats,
bytes: packet_len,
packet_meta: meta.into(),
}]
} else if session
.highest_received_seq
.is_some_and(|h| sequence_is_before(wire_seq, h))
{
vec![ClientEvent::LateReply {
seq: wire_seq,
highest_seen: session.highest_received_seq.unwrap(),
remote: self.remote,
sent_at: None,
received_at: now,
rtt: None,
server_timing: build_server_timing(&reply.timestamps),
one_way: None,
received_stats: build_received_stats(&reply),
bytes: packet_len,
packet_meta: meta.into(),
}]
} else {
vec![ClientEvent::Warning {
kind: WarningKind::UntrackedReply,
message: format!(
"dropped reply with untracked seq {wire_seq} (no pending or completed entry)"
),
at: now,
}]
}
};
if should_close {
let packets_sent = self.packets_sent();
self.state = MachineState::Closed {
source: CloseSource::Peer,
packets_sent,
};
events.push(ClientEvent::SessionClosed {
remote: self.remote,
token,
at: now,
});
}
Ok(events)
}
fn open_session(&self) -> Result<&ActiveSession, ClientError> {
match &self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => Ok(session),
MachineState::Closed { .. } => Err(ClientError::AlreadyClosed),
MachineState::Connected => Err(ClientError::NotOpen),
MachineState::NoTestCompleted => Err(ClientError::AlreadyCompleted),
}
}
fn ensure_connected(&self) -> Result<(), ClientError> {
match self.state {
MachineState::Connected => Ok(()),
MachineState::Open(_) => Err(ClientError::AlreadyOpen),
MachineState::Closed { .. } => Err(ClientError::AlreadyClosed),
MachineState::NoTestCompleted => Err(ClientError::AlreadyCompleted),
}
}
fn open_session_mut(&mut self) -> Result<&mut ActiveSession, ClientError> {
match &mut self.state {
MachineState::Open(session) => Ok(session),
MachineState::Closed { .. } => Err(ClientError::AlreadyClosed),
MachineState::Connected => Err(ClientError::NotOpen),
MachineState::NoTestCompleted => Err(ClientError::AlreadyCompleted),
}
}
}
/// Sizes the receive buffer for the negotiated layout.
///
/// Fallible only because a negotiated length wider than `usize` cannot name a
/// buffer at all. Negotiation already rejects a returned length that is
/// negative or larger than this client requested, and the requested length is a
/// `u32`, so the error is unreachable here in practice — it is propagated
/// rather than asserted away so that no 64-bit assumption is baked in.
pub(crate) fn recv_buffer_size(
has_hmac: bool,
negotiated: Option<&NegotiatedParams>,
) -> Result<usize, ClientError> {
Ok(match negotiated {
Some(negotiated) => echo_packet_len(has_hmac, &negotiated.params)?
.saturating_add(1)
.max(MIN_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE),
None => MIN_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE,
})
}
pub(crate) fn params_from_config(config: &ClientConfig) -> Result<Params, ClientError> {
validate_protocol_config(config)?;
Ok(Params {
protocol_version: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
duration_ns: match config.duration {
Some(duration) => config_duration_to_ns("duration", duration)?,
None => 0,
},
interval_ns: config_duration_to_ns("interval", config.interval)?,
length: i64::from(config.length),
received_stats: config.received_stats,
stamp_at: config.stamp_at,
clock: config.clock,
dscp: i64::from(dscp_codepoint_to_traffic_class(config.dscp)?),
server_fill: config.server_fill.clone().map(|value| ServerFill { value }),
})
}
pub(crate) fn update_highest_received(highest_received_seq: &mut Option<u32>, wire_seq: u32) {
*highest_received_seq = Some(highest_received_seq.map_or(wire_seq, |h| {
if sequence_is_after(wire_seq, h) {
wire_seq
} else {
h
}
}));
}
pub(crate) fn sequence_is_after(candidate: u32, current: u32) -> bool {
candidate != current && candidate.wrapping_sub(current) < (1 << 31)
}
pub(crate) fn sequence_is_before(candidate: u32, current: u32) -> bool {
sequence_is_after(current, candidate)
}
pub(crate) fn compute_rtt(
sent_at: &ClientTimestamp,
received_at: &ClientTimestamp,
ts: &TimestampFields,
) -> RttSample {
let raw = received_at
.mono
.checked_duration_since(sent_at.mono)
.unwrap_or(Duration::ZERO);
let server_processing = compute_server_processing(ts);
let adjusted = server_processing
.map(|sp| SignedDuration::from_nanos(duration_ns_i128(raw) - duration_ns_i128(sp)));
let effective = adjusted.unwrap_or_else(|| SignedDuration::from_duration(raw));
RttSample {
raw,
adjusted,
effective,
}
}
fn duration_ns_i128(duration: Duration) -> i128 {
i128::try_from(duration.as_nanos()).unwrap_or(i128::MAX)
}
fn compute_server_processing(ts: &TimestampFields) -> Option<Duration> {
if let (Some(recv_mono), Some(send_mono)) = (ts.recv_mono, ts.send_mono) {
let diff = send_mono.checked_sub(recv_mono)?;
return Some(Duration::from_nanos(u64::try_from(diff).ok()?));
}
if let (Some(recv_wall), Some(send_wall)) = (ts.recv_wall, ts.send_wall) {
let diff = send_wall.checked_sub(recv_wall)?;
return Some(Duration::from_nanos(u64::try_from(diff).ok()?));
}
None
}
fn build_server_timing(ts: &TimestampFields) -> Option<ServerTiming> {
if ts.recv_wall.is_none()
&& ts.recv_mono.is_none()
&& ts.send_wall.is_none()
&& ts.send_mono.is_none()
&& ts.midpoint_wall.is_none()
&& ts.midpoint_mono.is_none()
{
return None;
}
Some(ServerTiming {
receive_wall_ns: ts.recv_wall,
receive_mono_ns: ts.recv_mono,
send_wall_ns: ts.send_wall,
send_mono_ns: ts.send_mono,
midpoint_wall_ns: ts.midpoint_wall,
midpoint_mono_ns: ts.midpoint_mono,
processing: compute_server_processing(ts),
})
}
/// Selects the client send wall-clock endpoint for upstream one-way delay.
///
/// Prefers the correlated Linux kernel `TX_SOFTWARE` timestamp — a software
/// timestamp near the driver handoff, not physical NIC departure — when it
/// is locally plausible: it must not precede `tx_not_before_wall` and must
/// not follow `received_at`, both on the client's own wall clock.
/// `tx_not_before_wall` is the pre-send send-anchor sample, not the
/// post-send `sent_at_wall` fallback below — a legitimate `TX_SOFTWARE`
/// timestamp can be generated while the send syscall is still in flight and
/// therefore legitimately precede the post-send `sent_at` sample, so the
/// lower bound must stay anchored before the send rather than after it.
/// Comparing only these two same-client anchors means the check detects
/// local causal-ordering inconsistency (e.g. a backward wall-clock step),
/// not every possible wall-clock discontinuity, and it deliberately does
/// not compare against the remote server's wall clock: cross-host clock
/// offset is a synchronization property of the resulting delay, not
/// evidence that this endpoint is invalid. There is no maximum lag bound —
/// unlike scheduler wakeup delay on the receive side, legitimate
/// send-to-receive time can exceed a second. Falls back to `sent_at_wall`
/// (the post-send measurement) when the kernel timestamp is absent or fails
/// this check; the raw observation on `PendingProbe` is never mutated by a
/// fallback here.
fn preferred_send_wall(
tx_not_before_wall: SystemTime,
sent_at_wall: SystemTime,
kernel_tx_timestamp: Option<SystemTime>,
received_at: SystemTime,
) -> SystemTime {
match kernel_tx_timestamp {
Some(kernel_tx) if tx_not_before_wall <= kernel_tx && kernel_tx <= received_at => kernel_tx,
_ => sent_at_wall,
}
}
/// Computes both one-way delay directions from wall-clock endpoints.
///
/// The upstream direction prefers a locally plausible correlated kernel
/// `TX_SOFTWARE` send timestamp over the userspace post-send `sent_at`
/// sample; see [`preferred_send_wall`]. `tx_not_before_wall` is the private
/// pre-send lower bound used only for that plausibility check — it is never
/// itself a candidate endpoint. The downstream direction uses
/// [`ReceiveMeta::preferred_receive_wall`], which prefers a plausible kernel
/// receive timestamp over the userspace receive wall sample. Neither kernel
/// timestamp is ever used for RTT.
pub(crate) fn compute_one_way(
sent_at: &ClientTimestamp,
tx_not_before_wall: SystemTime,
received_at: &ClientTimestamp,
kernel_tx_timestamp: Option<SystemTime>,
meta: &ReceiveMeta,
ts: &TimestampFields,
) -> Option<OneWayDelaySample> {
let server_recv_wall = ts.recv_wall.or(ts.midpoint_wall);
let server_send_wall = ts.send_wall.or(ts.midpoint_wall);
let client_send_wall = preferred_send_wall(
tx_not_before_wall,
sent_at.wall,
kernel_tx_timestamp,
received_at.wall,
);
let client_send_ns = unix_epoch_ns_i64(client_send_wall);
let client_recv_ns = unix_epoch_ns_i64(meta.preferred_receive_wall(received_at.wall));
let c2s = server_recv_wall
.zip(client_send_ns)
.and_then(|(srv, cli)| srv.checked_sub(cli))
.map(|d| SignedDuration::from_nanos(i128::from(d)));
let s2c = client_recv_ns
.zip(server_send_wall)
.and_then(|(cli, srv)| cli.checked_sub(srv))
.map(|d| SignedDuration::from_nanos(i128::from(d)));
if c2s.is_none() && s2c.is_none() {
return None;
}
Some(OneWayDelaySample {
client_to_server: c2s,
server_to_client: s2c,
})
}
pub(crate) fn unix_epoch_ns_i64(time: SystemTime) -> Option<i64> {
time.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.ok()
.and_then(|duration| i64::try_from(duration.as_nanos()).ok())
}
fn build_received_stats(reply: &EchoReply) -> Option<ReceivedStatsSample> {
if reply.recv_count.is_none() && reply.recv_window.is_none() {
return None;
}
Some(ReceivedStatsSample {
count: reply.recv_count,
window: reply.recv_window,
})
}
fn validate_protocol_config(config: &ClientConfig) -> Result<(), ClientError> {
if config.duration == Some(Duration::ZERO) {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: "duration must be greater than zero; use None for continuous mode".to_owned(),
});
}
if config.interval == Duration::ZERO {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: "interval must be greater than zero".to_owned(),
});
}
if config.clock == Clock::Unspecified {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: "clock must be wall, monotonic, or both".to_owned(),
});
}
if config.dscp > MAX_DSCP_CODEPOINT {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: format!("dscp must be <= {MAX_DSCP_CODEPOINT}"),
});
}
if config.length > MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_LENGTH {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: format!("packet length must be <= {MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_LENGTH}"),
});
}
if let Some(fill) = &config.server_fill {
let len = fill.len();
if len == 0 {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: "server_fill must not be empty".to_owned(),
});
}
if len > MAX_SERVER_FILL_BYTES {
return Err(ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: format!("server_fill must be <= {MAX_SERVER_FILL_BYTES} bytes, got {len}"),
});
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn config_duration_to_ns(field: &str, duration: Duration) -> Result<i64, ClientError> {
i64::try_from(duration.as_nanos()).map_err(|_| ClientError::InvalidConfig {
reason: format!("{field} is too large to encode as nanoseconds"),
})
}