Files
irtt-rs/crates/irtt-proto/src/open.rs
T
Nils Andreas Svee 328ff17901 docs(irtt-proto): add runnable doctests for public API
Add executable doctests documenting the consumer-facing contract of
irtt-proto: the directional request encode/decode/verify split, Params
construction and round-trip, omitted-vs-explicit-zero presence, open and
echo reply round trips, packet length calculation, and HMAC verification.

No conventional tests are migrated: every existing irtt-proto test
exercises wire vectors, flag matrices, malformed input, layout rules,
HMAC error behavior, or encode/decode round trips, which the crate's
AGENTS.md treats as durable compatibility coverage rather than
documentation cleanup targets.
2026-09-24 16:29:40 +07:00

151 lines
4.8 KiB
Rust

use crate::{
envelope::{self, FlagRule},
flags::{has, FLAG_CLOSE, FLAG_OPEN, FLAG_REPLY},
layout::PacketLayout,
params::Params,
ProtoError, Result, TOKEN_SIZE,
};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct OpenReply {
pub flags: u8,
pub token: u64,
pub params: Params,
}
/// Encodes an open reply.
///
/// `hmac_key` is authoritative: `Some(key)` sets `FLAG_HMAC` and signs the
/// finished datagram, while `None` produces an unauthenticated reply and clears
/// any caller-supplied `FLAG_HMAC`. A zero token is rejected unless the reply
/// also carries `FLAG_CLOSE` (a rejected open).
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns [`ProtoError::MissingFlag`] when the reply lacks `FLAG_OPEN` or
/// `FLAG_REPLY`, and [`ProtoError::ZeroToken`] for a zero token without
/// `FLAG_CLOSE`.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use irtt_proto::{
/// decode_open_reply, encode_open_reply, OpenReply, Params, FLAG_OPEN, FLAG_REPLY,
/// };
///
/// let reply = OpenReply {
/// flags: FLAG_OPEN | FLAG_REPLY,
/// token: 0x1234_5678_9abc_def0,
/// params: Params::with_protocol_defaults(),
/// };
/// let packet = encode_open_reply(&reply, None).unwrap();
/// assert_eq!(decode_open_reply(&packet, None).unwrap(), reply);
/// ```
pub fn encode_open_reply(reply: &OpenReply, hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let params = reply.params.encode();
let mut out = envelope::begin_checked(
reply.flags,
hmac_key,
&[FlagRule::Require(FLAG_OPEN), FlagRule::Require(FLAG_REPLY)],
PacketLayout::open_reply(hmac_key.is_some()).header_len() + params.len(),
)?;
if reply.token == 0 && !has(reply.flags, FLAG_CLOSE) {
return Err(ProtoError::ZeroToken);
}
out.extend_from_slice(&reply.token.to_le_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&params);
envelope::finish(out, hmac_key)
}
/// Decodes an open reply.
///
/// Requires `FLAG_OPEN` and `FLAG_REPLY`, and — when `hmac_key` is supplied —
/// verifies the authentication field. The decoded [`Params`] are validated:
/// malformed or incompatible parameter values are rejected here.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns [`ProtoError::MissingFlag`], [`ProtoError::HmacPresenceMismatch`],
/// [`ProtoError::BadHmac`], [`ProtoError::PacketTooShort`],
/// [`ProtoError::ZeroToken`], or a parameter decode error. See
/// [`encode_open_reply`] for a round-trip example.
pub fn decode_open_reply(packet: &[u8], hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>) -> Result<OpenReply> {
let envelope = envelope::decode(
packet,
hmac_key,
&[FlagRule::Require(FLAG_OPEN), FlagRule::Require(FLAG_REPLY)],
)?;
envelope::verify(packet, hmac_key)?;
let mut pos = envelope.body_offset;
let needed = pos + TOKEN_SIZE;
if packet.len() < needed {
return Err(ProtoError::PacketTooShort {
needed,
actual: packet.len(),
});
}
let token = u64::from_le_bytes(packet[pos..pos + TOKEN_SIZE].try_into().unwrap());
pos += TOKEN_SIZE;
if token == 0 && !has(envelope.flags, FLAG_CLOSE) {
return Err(ProtoError::ZeroToken);
}
Ok(OpenReply {
flags: envelope.flags,
token,
params: Params::decode(&packet[pos..])?,
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::{
hmac,
params::{Clock, ReceivedStats, StampAt},
FLAG_HMAC, HMAC_SIZE,
};
fn default_params() -> Params {
Params {
protocol_version: 1,
duration_ns: 3_000_000_000,
interval_ns: 1_000_000_000,
received_stats: ReceivedStats::Both,
stamp_at: StampAt::Both,
clock: Clock::Both,
..Params::default()
}
}
#[test]
fn open_reply_decodes_token() {
let mut packet = vec![0x14, 0xa7, 0x5b, 0x03];
packet.extend_from_slice(&0x7896_b6ab_8771_5213u64.to_le_bytes());
packet.extend_from_slice(&default_params().encode());
let reply = decode_open_reply(&packet, None).unwrap();
assert_eq!(reply.token, 0x7896_b6ab_8771_5213);
assert_eq!(reply.params, default_params());
}
#[test]
fn hmac_open_reply_decodes_token_after_hmac_field() {
let mut packet = vec![0x14, 0xa7, 0x5b, FLAG_OPEN | FLAG_REPLY | FLAG_HMAC];
packet.extend_from_slice(&[0; HMAC_SIZE]);
packet.extend_from_slice(&0x7896_b6ab_8771_5213u64.to_le_bytes());
packet.extend_from_slice(&default_params().encode());
hmac::compute_hmac_in_place(b"testkey", &mut packet, hmac::hmac_offset()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
packet.len(),
4 + HMAC_SIZE + TOKEN_SIZE + default_params().encode().len()
);
let reply = decode_open_reply(&packet, Some(b"testkey")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(reply.token, 0x7896_b6ab_8771_5213);
assert_eq!(reply.params, default_params());
}
}