chore(deps): update github actions

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -158,3 +158,6 @@ jobs:
             --all-features \
             --no-deps \
             --locked
+
+      - name: Run doctests
+        run: cargo test --workspace --doc --all-features --locked

.gitea/workflows/docker-publish.yml

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ jobs:
       # (native builds, no emulation), but buildx still needs a driver that
       # can assemble a multi-platform manifest list.
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@37fe631027851001ddb9b187196cc803df7f5f0e # v4
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4
 
       - name: Log in to Gitea Container Registry
         uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ jobs:
       # below), never a separate build, so the hash matches everywhere.
       - name: Build and push to Gitea
         id: build
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@53b7df96c91f9c12dcc8a07bcb9ccacbed38856a # v7
+        uses: docker/build-push-action@c3c9e263c25d99ce0380d002d59b67737d91b0dc # v7
         with:
           context: .
           platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64

.gitea/workflows/fuzz.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: Proto Fuzz Smoke
+name: Fuzz Smoke
 
 on:
   push:
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ jobs:
         # regression; this is not meant to be exhaustive fuzzing.
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          for target in decode_request decode_open_reply decode_echo_reply decode_params decode_varint; do
+          for target in decode_request decode_open_reply decode_echo_reply decode_params decode_varint server_core_datagrams; do
             echo "::group::fuzz smoke: ${target}"
             RUSTUP_TOOLCHAIN="${FUZZ_TOOLCHAIN}" cargo fuzz run --target "${FUZZ_TARGET}" "${target}" -- \
               -max_total_time=10 \

.github/workflows/actions-security.yml

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
       # It remains here while portable actionlint runs with Gitea CI, but scans
       # both workflow directories through its GitHub Actions rule set.
       - name: Run zizmor
-        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@70fb788f84895a7701f5643d103d587e460b5c99 # v0.6.3
+        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
         with:
           persona: regular
           inputs: |

.github/workflows/osv-scanner.yml

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ permissions:
 jobs:
   scan-scheduled:
     if: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'schedule' }}
-    uses: "google/osv-scanner-action/.github/workflows/osv-scanner-reusable.yml@6e4298ebc4db23e847df9b2e2de2939d6f066c67" # v2.5.1
+    uses: "google/osv-scanner-action/.github/workflows/osv-scanner-reusable.yml@a345acffa64b0eaede81a3d9aae6141214d9c8fc" # v2.6.0
     with:
       # Example of specifying custom arguments
       scan-args: |-
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jobs:
         ./
   scan-pr:
     if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' || github.event_name == 'merge_group' }}
-    uses: "google/osv-scanner-action/.github/workflows/osv-scanner-reusable-pr.yml@6e4298ebc4db23e847df9b2e2de2939d6f066c67" # v2.5.1
+    uses: "google/osv-scanner-action/.github/workflows/osv-scanner-reusable-pr.yml@a345acffa64b0eaede81a3d9aae6141214d9c8fc" # v2.6.0
     with:
       # Example of specifying custom arguments
       scan-args: |-

.github/workflows/rust-clippy.yml

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ jobs:
           exit 0
 
       - name: Upload Clippy SARIF
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63 # v4
         if: always()
         with:
           sarif_file: rust-clippy-results.sarif

AGENTS.md

@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ Use the narrowest useful checks first. For substantive workspace changes, final
 cargo fmt --all -- --check
 cargo check --workspace --all-targets --all-features --locked
 cargo test --workspace --all-targets --all-features --locked
+cargo test --workspace --doc --all-features --locked
 cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features --locked -- -D warnings
 ```
 

README.md

@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ when to use it instead of `irtt-client`/`irtt-server` directly.
 ```sh
 cargo fmt --all -- --check
 cargo test --workspace --locked
+cargo test --workspace --doc --all-features --locked
 cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features --locked -- -D warnings
 ```
 

crates/irtt-app/src/applet.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ pub fn detect_applet_from_argv0(argv0: &str) -> Option<RequestedApplet> {
     match applet_basename(argv0) {
         "irtt-client" => Some(RequestedApplet::Client),
         "irtt-tui" => Some(RequestedApplet::Tui),
-        "irttd" | "irtt-server" => Some(RequestedApplet::Server),
+        "irtt-server" => Some(RequestedApplet::Server),
         "irtt-rs" => None,
         _ => None,
     }
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ mod tests {
             detect_applet_from_argv0("irtt-server"),
             Some(RequestedApplet::Server)
         );
+        assert_eq!(detect_applet_from_argv0("irttd"), None);
         assert_eq!(detect_applet_from_argv0("irtt-rs"), None);
         assert_eq!(detect_applet_from_argv0("custom-name"), None);
     }

crates/irtt-app/src/cmd/server/args.rs

@@ -106,10 +106,22 @@ pub struct ServerArgs {
     pub timestamp_allowance: Option<TimestampAllowanceArg>,
 
     /// Refuse to provide requested DSCP marking.
+    //
+    // `FalseyValueParser` rather than clap's default `bool` parser for a flag,
+    // which is what makes IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP usable from the environment at
+    // all. A flag's default parser accepts only the literals `true` and
+    // `false`, so the ordinary container/orchestrator spelling
+    // `IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP=1` did not enable the flag — it failed argument
+    // parsing and the server refused to start. Falsey semantics are clap's own
+    // documented recipe for a boolean environment flag: `0`, `false`, `no`,
+    // `n`, `off` and empty are off, anything else is on, and an absent
+    // variable is off as before. The command-line flag is unaffected: it still
+    // takes no value and still means "on".
     #[arg(
         long,
         env = "IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP",
-        long_help = "Refuse to provide requested traffic-class marking. Any requested DSCP is negotiated to zero, so the client is told its echo replies will be unmarked, and they are sent unmarked. The session is not refused."
+        value_parser = clap::builder::FalseyValueParser::new(),
+        long_help = "Refuse to provide requested traffic-class marking. Any requested DSCP is negotiated to zero, so the client is told its echo replies will be unmarked, and they are sent unmarked. The session is not refused.\n\nIRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP sets the same thing from the environment: 0, false, no, n, off and an empty value leave marking enabled, and any other value disables it."
     )]
     pub no_dscp: bool,
 }
@@ -548,6 +560,43 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    /// `IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP` is the one policy variable whose value is a
+    /// boolean rather than a number, a duration or a string, and the
+    /// container/orchestrator deployments this whole environment surface
+    /// exists for spell booleans `1`/`0`. clap's default parser for a flag
+    /// accepts only the literals `true`/`false` and turns everything else
+    /// into a *parse failure*, so `IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP=1` used to stop the
+    /// server from starting at all rather than enabling the flag. Falsey
+    /// semantics are what keeps that from being a startup failure.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_no_dscp_environment_variable_accepts_ordinary_boolean_spellings() {
+        for value in ["1", "true", "TRUE", "yes", "on", "enabled"] {
+            with_env(&[("IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP", value)], || {
+                let config = parse(&["--bind", "127.0.0.1:2112"])
+                    .expect("a truthy value must not fail argument parsing")
+                    .server_config();
+                assert!(!config.dscp_allowed(), "IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP={value}");
+            });
+        }
+
+        for value in ["0", "false", "no", "off", ""] {
+            with_env(&[("IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP", value)], || {
+                let config = parse(&["--bind", "127.0.0.1:2112"])
+                    .expect("a falsey value must not fail argument parsing")
+                    .server_config();
+                assert!(config.dscp_allowed(), "IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP={value}");
+            });
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The command-line flag stays a flag: it takes no value, whatever the
+    /// environment parser accepts.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_no_dscp_flag_still_takes_no_command_line_value() {
+        assert!(parse(&["--bind", "127.0.0.1:2112", "--no-dscp=false"]).is_err());
+        assert!(!bound(&["--no-dscp"]).server_config().dscp_allowed());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn an_explicit_flag_overrides_the_environment() {
         with_env(&[("IRTT_SERVER_MAX_SESSIONS", "512")], || {

crates/irtt-client/AGENTS.md

@@ -26,30 +26,30 @@ configuration (`try_enable_tx_timestamping` restores it explicitly) and
 timing falls back to userspace `sent_at` as it always has. TX capability
 failure is never a public error and is never logged from the library.
 
-### Correlation invariant: kernel ID == wire sequence
+### Best-effort kernel-ID correlation
 
-The client uses the kernel's automatic `OPT_ID` directly as the probe's wire
+The client uses the kernel's automatic `OPT_ID` as the probe's wire-sequence
-sequence number — no separate correlation map. This is safe because:
+correlation ID — no separate correlation map. On the normal successful-send
+path, both counters start at zero after Open and advance together. This is
+not a permanent identity: a kernel ID can theoretically be consumed while a
+send is being prepared and then survive a subsequent send failure, leaving
+kernel IDs one or more steps ahead of `next_wire_seq`. Do not restore an
+assumption that failed or nonblocking sends cannot cause that desynchrony.
 
-- **A failed/nonblocking send never consumes an ID.** Linux increments the
+The effect is confined to the optional timing enhancement. A kernel timestamp
-  per-socket ID counter (`sk->sk_tskey`) speculatively while building a
+whose ID cannot be matched to a pending or retained timed-out probe is
-  datagram and rolls the increment back (`atomic_dec`) on every error path
+discarded, as is any implausible timestamp; `sent_at` remains the ordinary
-  out of `__ip_append_data`/`__ip6_append_data`
+userspace fallback. **After every failed probe submission, disable kernel-ID
-  (`net/ipv4/ip_output.c`, `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c`), guarded by a local
+correlation for the rest of that session.** A gap means an otherwise plausible
-  `hold_tskey` flag. A `WouldBlock` `try_send` therefore can never leave a
+later ID can name the wrong probe, so subsequent error-queue timestamps must
-  gap in, or otherwise advance, the ID the kernel will assign to the next
+be discarded rather than attached by ID. This is safe because:
-  *successful* submission. (`include/net/sock.h`'s `_sock_tx_timestamp`
+
-  performs the same increment for the non-corked path.) Client-side, the
+- **Normal successful sends track together.** `wire_seq` starts at 0 on every
-  existing send transaction only calls `commit_probe_sent` — which is the
+  successful Open (`SessionMachine::commit_open` builds a fresh
-  only thing that advances `next_wire_seq` — after a successful socket send;
+  `ActiveSession` with `next_wire_seq: 0`) and advances by exactly 1 only via
-  a `WouldBlock` result never reaches it.
+  `commit_probe_sent`, after a confirmed successful socket send. TX
-- **The two counters start together and advance together.** `wire_seq`
+  timestamping is enabled after that same successful Open and before any probe
-  starts at 0 on every successful Open (`SessionMachine::commit_open` builds
+  is sent, so the normal zero points line up.
-  a fresh `ActiveSession` with `next_wire_seq: 0`) and advances by exactly 1
-  only via `commit_probe_sent`, which only runs after a confirmed successful
-  send — the same condition under which the kernel's counter advances by 1.
-  TX timestamping is enabled only after that same successful Open and before
-  any probe is sent, so both counters' zero points line up exactly.
 - **One socket, one session, no reopen.** `SessionMachine`'s state machine
   only reaches `Open` from `Connected`, and `commit_open`/`commit_local_close`
   never route back to `Connected`. A `Client`/`AsyncClient` cannot reopen a

crates/irtt-client/src/async_client.rs

@@ -608,8 +608,14 @@ impl AsyncClient {
                 // No sent_at measurement, no machine commit, no schedule
                 // commit: the transaction is fully discarded and retried
                 // with a fresh send_anchor on the next loop iteration.
-                Err(error) if error.kind() == io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => continue,
+                Err(error) if error.kind() == io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
-                Err(error) => return Poll::Ready(Err(ClientError::Socket(error))),
+                    self.machine.invalidate_kernel_tx_correlation();
+                    continue;
+                }
+                Err(error) => {
+                    self.machine.invalidate_kernel_tx_correlation();
+                    return Poll::Ready(Err(ClientError::Socket(error)));
+                }
             };
 
             #[cfg(not(test))]

crates/irtt-client/src/client.rs

@@ -163,12 +163,13 @@ impl Client {
     ///
     /// On success, returns the negotiated open outcome and transitions the
     /// client into either an open probe session or completed no-test state.
-    /// Open attempts use [`ClientConfig::open_timeouts`]. Malformed, unrelated,
+    /// Open attempts use [`ClientConfig::open_timeouts`]. Malformed or
-    /// or unauthenticated datagrams are ignored until the current attempt's
+    /// unrelated datagrams are ignored until the current attempt's absolute
-    /// absolute deadline, so one attempt may consume several datagrams without
+    /// deadline, so one attempt may consume several datagrams without
     /// retransmitting. Silence or ignored traffic eventually produces
-    /// [`ClientError::OpenTimeout`], while authenticated incompatibility remains
+    /// [`ClientError::OpenTimeout`]. A structurally recognizable malformed or
-    /// terminal.
+    /// incompatible Open reply from the connected peer is terminal; when HMAC
+    /// is configured, that recognition additionally requires authentication.
     ///
     /// When a trusted reply allocates a token but later negotiation or socket
     /// preparation fails, the client sends a best-effort cleanup close and
@@ -523,11 +524,18 @@ impl Client {
             .unwrap_or_else(Instant::now);
         #[cfg(test)]
         if fail_send {
+            runtime.invalidate_kernel_tx_correlation();
             return Err(ClientError::Socket(io::Error::other(
                 "injected probe send failure",
             )));
         }
-        let bytes = socket.send(&prepared.bytes)?;
+        let bytes = match socket.send(&prepared.bytes) {
+            Ok(bytes) => bytes,
+            Err(error) => {
+                runtime.invalidate_kernel_tx_correlation();
+                return Err(ClientError::Socket(error));
+            }
+        };
         #[cfg(not(test))]
         let send_finished_at = Instant::now();
         #[cfg(test)]

crates/irtt-client/src/managed/task.rs

@@ -1613,6 +1613,30 @@ impl ManagedClientTask {
         self.send_gate = self.send_gate.filter(|gate| *gate > now);
     }
 
+    /// The next stagger gate after a send was accepted at `accepted_at`.
+    ///
+    /// The gate advances on its **own** cadence rather than being re-anchored
+    /// on every observed accept time. Anchoring on `accepted_at` folds each
+    /// send's wakeup latency into the next slot and then into every slot after
+    /// it, so the gate — and with it the whole group's send cadence — drifts
+    /// later without bound while the per-target schedules stay on their
+    /// absolute grid. The drift is not hypothetical: it shows up as a
+    /// monotonically growing `EchoSent::timer_error` and, once it exceeds one
+    /// interval, as probe slots the schedule then skips.
+    ///
+    /// `accepted_at` is still the anchor in the two cases where continuing the
+    /// old cadence would be wrong: there is no previous gate, or the pacer has
+    /// fallen a full slot behind it. Re-anchoring there is what keeps a gate
+    /// stranded in the past from releasing a burst of catch-up sends once the
+    /// group starts moving again.
+    fn next_stagger_gate(&self, spacing: Duration, accepted_at: Instant) -> Option<Instant> {
+        let base = match self.send_gate {
+            Some(gate) if gate <= accepted_at && accepted_at.duration_since(gate) < spacing => gate,
+            _ => accepted_at,
+        };
+        base.checked_add(spacing)
+    }
+
     fn record_stagger_acceptance(
         &mut self,
         result: SendResult,
@@ -1626,7 +1650,7 @@ impl ManagedClientTask {
             return;
         };
         self.last_stagger_send = Some(accepted_at);
-        self.send_gate = accepted_at.checked_add(spacing);
+        self.send_gate = self.next_stagger_gate(spacing, accepted_at);
         #[cfg(test)]
         if let Some(observations) = &self.stagger_observations {
             observations.lock().unwrap().push((_active, spacing));

crates/irtt-client/src/managed/tests.rs

@@ -1895,6 +1895,78 @@ fn stagger_gate_tracks_active_membership() {
     second.finish();
 }
 
+/// The stagger gate must not fold each send's observed wakeup latency into
+/// every later slot.
+///
+/// The gate is the binding constraint on when the *group* may send next (see
+/// `next_deadline`), while each target's own schedule stays on an absolute
+/// grid anchored at its open. Re-anchoring the gate on every observed accept
+/// time therefore made the whole group's cadence drift later without bound:
+/// `EchoSent::timer_error` grew monotonically, and once the drift exceeded one
+/// interval `skip_missed_probe_slots_at` started dropping probe slots
+/// outright. Measured before this was fixed, a single-target 20 s run at a
+/// 50 ms interval sent 381 probes instead of 400.
+///
+/// This asserts the invariant directly rather than through a real-time run,
+/// because reproducing accumulation behaviorally needs seconds of wall clock
+/// and a jitter assumption. Two properties, both durable:
+///
+/// - while the pacer keeps up, N accepted sends advance the gate by exactly
+///   N spacings from the first anchor, whatever lateness each send is
+///   observed with;
+/// - a gate the pacer has fallen a full spacing behind re-anchors on the
+///   accept time instead, so a stranded gate cannot release a burst of
+///   catch-up sends.
+#[test]
+fn the_stagger_gate_advances_by_one_spacing_per_send_without_accumulating_lateness() {
+    // No socket is involved: the gate is driven directly and the task is never
+    // polled, so an unreachable address is all a valid target set needs here.
+    let (mut task, _) = ManagedClient::task(
+        config(ManagedPacing::Staggered),
+        vec![target("only", "127.0.0.1:9".parse().unwrap())],
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    let spacing = Duration::from_millis(50);
+    let start = Instant::now();
+    let lateness = Duration::from_millis(3);
+
+    task.record_stagger_acceptance(
+        SendResult::Ready { accepted: true },
+        Some((1, spacing)),
+        start,
+    );
+    assert_eq!(task.send_gate, Some(start + spacing), "first send anchors");
+
+    // Every later send is observed `lateness` after the gate that released it.
+    // The gate must still advance one spacing per send from `start`, not
+    // `spacing + lateness`.
+    for slot in 1..=8_u32 {
+        let released_at = start + spacing * slot;
+        task.record_stagger_acceptance(
+            SendResult::Ready { accepted: true },
+            Some((1, spacing)),
+            released_at + lateness,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            task.send_gate,
+            Some(start + spacing * (slot + 1)),
+            "slot {slot} accumulated observed lateness into the gate"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // A full spacing behind is no longer the same cadence, so the gate
+    // re-anchors rather than staying stranded in the past.
+    let stalled_gate = task.send_gate.expect("the gate is set");
+    let resumed_at = stalled_gate + spacing;
+    task.record_stagger_acceptance(
+        SendResult::Ready { accepted: true },
+        Some((1, spacing)),
+        resumed_at,
+    );
+    assert_eq!(task.send_gate, Some(resumed_at + spacing));
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn timeout_discovery_inspects_at_most_one_budget_of_targets() {
     let target_count = TIMEOUT_WORK_BUDGET + 1;

crates/irtt-client/src/probe.rs

@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ pub(crate) struct PendingProbe {
     /// eligible only for upstream one-way delay after local plausibility
     /// validation against `tx_not_before_wall` (see `compute_one_way`'s
     /// `preferred_send_wall`). `sent_at` remains the userspace fallback for
-    /// upstream one-way delay when this is absent or implausible.
+    /// upstream one-way delay when this is absent, implausible, or kernel-ID
+    /// correlation was invalidated by a failed probe submission.
     pub kernel_tx_timestamp: Option<SystemTime>,
 }
 

crates/irtt-client/src/receive/linux.rs

@@ -12,14 +12,17 @@
 //! After a successful Open, the client adapter best-effort upgrades the
 //! socket from [`RX_TIMESTAMPING_FLAGS`] to [`error_queue::TX_TIMESTAMPING_FLAGS`]
 //! via [`try_enable_tx_timestamping`]. When that succeeds, the automatic
-//! `SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID` counter the kernel assigns to each successfully
+//! `SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID` counter normally tracks the probe wire sequence
-//! submitted datagram is used directly as the probe's wire sequence number
+//! after successful sends, so it is used as a best-effort correlation ID.
-//! (see the client crate's `AGENTS.md` for the correlation invariant this
+//! A kernel ID can theoretically be consumed by a send that later fails,
-//! relies on). [`drain_tx_timestamps`] performs a small bounded, nonblocking
+//! desynchronizing that correlation. [`drain_tx_timestamps`] discards
-//! read of `MSG_ERRQUEUE` so the adapter can opportunistically collect those
+//! unmatched or implausible records; the userspace `sent_at` timestamp remains
-//! timestamps without ever waiting for one. The observed kernel TX wall time
+//! the fallback. After a probe send failure, correlation is disabled for that
-//! is retained as metadata only; it is not consumed by any measurement in
+//! session so later IDs cannot be misattributed. It performs a small bounded,
-//! this change.
+//! nonblocking read of
+//! `MSG_ERRQUEUE` so the adapter can opportunistically collect timestamps
+//! without ever waiting for one. The observed kernel TX wall time is retained
+//! as metadata only; it is not consumed by any measurement in this change.
 
 use std::{
     io::{self, IoSliceMut},

crates/irtt-client/src/receive/linux/error_queue.rs

@@ -624,22 +624,14 @@ mod tests {
         ));
     }
 
-    // NOTE: a live test proving that a failed nonblocking `sendmsg` does not
+    // NOTE: There is no live test for whether a failed nonblocking `sendmsg`
-    // consume an automatic OPT_ID is not included here. Forcing a reliable,
+    // consumes an automatic OPT_ID. Forcing a reliable, non-flaky `WouldBlock`
-    // non-flaky `WouldBlock` on a connected loopback UDP socket (e.g. via
+    // on a connected loopback UDP socket (for example through socket-buffer
-    // socket-buffer saturation) has no deterministic OS-level mechanism
+    // saturation) has no deterministic OS-level mechanism in this environment,
-    // available in this environment, and the repository's testing policy
+    // and the repository's testing policy forbids sleep/saturation-based
-    // explicitly forbids faking coverage with sleep/saturation-based
+    // flakiness. The correlation is intentionally best effort: a kernel ID can
-    // flakiness. That safety is instead established from Linux kernel
+    // theoretically be consumed by a send that later fails. The deterministic
-    // source: `_sock_tx_timestamp` (include/net/sock.h) and
+    // adapter test covers only the local half: an injected `WouldBlock` does
-    // `__ip_append_data`/`__ip6_append_data` (net/ipv4/ip_output.c,
+    // not advance the local wire-sequence counter. Any later unmatched kernel
-    // net/ipv6/ip6_output.c) increment `sk->sk_tskey` speculatively before
+    // timestamp is discarded and the userspace `sent_at` remains the fallback.
-    // a datagram is fully built and explicitly `atomic_dec` it back out on
-    // every error path (tracked via a local `hold_tskey` flag), so a failed
-    // send can never leave a gap in — or otherwise advance — the ID space
-    // the kernel hands out to successfully submitted datagrams. See the
-    // client crate's `AGENTS.md` for the full citation. The client-side
-    // half of this invariant (a `WouldBlock` `try_send` never advances the
-    // local wire-sequence counter used as the correlation ID) is covered by
-    // a deterministic test in the adapter module that injects `WouldBlock`.
 }

crates/irtt-client/src/session/machine.rs

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct ActiveSession {
     pending: PendingMap,
     timed_out: TimedOutMap,
     completed: CompletedSet,
+    kernel_tx_correlation_valid: bool,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
@@ -423,15 +424,27 @@ impl SessionMachine {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Disable Linux kernel TX timestamp correlation after a probe send fails.
+    ///
+    /// A failed submission can consume a kernel `SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID`
+    /// without advancing the wire sequence. Existing associated timestamps
+    /// remain valid observations; later error-queue timestamps cannot be
+    /// associated safely and are ignored for the rest of this session.
+    pub(crate) fn invalidate_kernel_tx_correlation(&mut self) {
+        if let MachineState::Open(session) = &mut self.state {
+            session.kernel_tx_correlation_valid = false;
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Record an observed Linux kernel TX timestamp for `wire_seq`, the
     /// automatic `SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID` the kernel assigned when the
     /// datagram was submitted.
     ///
-    /// `wire_seq` doubles as that correlation ID: both counters start at
+    /// `wire_seq` normally matches that correlation ID after successful
-    /// zero for a session's first timestamped send and advance by exactly
+    /// sends. This is best effort rather than an invariant: a kernel ID can
-    /// one only on a confirmed successful submission, so they stay
+    /// theoretically be consumed by a send that later fails, leaving the
-    /// identical for the life of one open session (see the client crate's
+    /// counters desynchronized. An unmatched or implausible ID is discarded;
-    /// `AGENTS.md` for the full invariant).
+    /// the probe's userspace `sent_at` remains the fallback.
     ///
     /// Updates a still-pending or already-timed-out probe in place. Never
     /// resurrects a completed, evicted, or unknown probe, and never touches
@@ -443,6 +456,9 @@ impl SessionMachine {
         let MachineState::Open(session) = &mut self.state else {
             return;
         };
+        if !session.kernel_tx_correlation_valid {
+            return;
+        }
         if let Some(probe) = session.pending.get_mut(wire_seq) {
             probe.kernel_tx_timestamp.get_or_insert(timestamp);
             return;
@@ -636,6 +652,7 @@ impl SessionMachine {
             pending: PendingMap::new(self.config.max_pending_probes),
             timed_out: TimedOutMap::new(self.config.max_pending_probes),
             completed: CompletedSet::new(self.config.max_pending_probes),
+            kernel_tx_correlation_valid: true,
         }));
 
         let event = ClientEvent::SessionStarted {
@@ -1231,6 +1248,7 @@ mod tests {
             pending: PendingMap::new(max_pending_probes),
             timed_out: TimedOutMap::new(max_pending_probes),
             completed: CompletedSet::new(max_pending_probes),
+            kernel_tx_correlation_valid: true,
         }));
         machine
     }
@@ -2873,6 +2891,25 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn invalidated_kernel_tx_correlation_uses_userspace_send_time() {
+        let mono = Instant::now();
+        let mut machine = upstream_probe(send_wall_ms(1_000), mono);
+
+        // A failed send can consume a kernel ID without advancing wire_seq.
+        // A later timestamp whose ID happens to match a pending wire sequence
+        // must not be associated after that gap.
+        machine.invalidate_kernel_tx_correlation();
+        machine.record_kernel_tx_timestamp(0, send_wall_ms(1_005));
+
+        let events = upstream_reply(&mut machine, 1_020, send_wall_ms(1_040), mono);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            reply_one_way(&events).unwrap().client_to_server,
+            Some(SignedDuration::from_nanos(20_000_000))
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn upstream_one_way_delay_falls_back_without_kernel_tx() {
         let mono = Instant::now();
@@ -3195,6 +3232,7 @@ mod tests {
                 pending: PendingMap::new(MAX_PENDING_PROBES),
                 timed_out: TimedOutMap::new(MAX_PENDING_PROBES),
                 completed: CompletedSet::new(MAX_PENDING_PROBES),
+                kernel_tx_correlation_valid: true,
             }));
             (machine, params)
         }

crates/irtt-server/AGENTS.md

@@ -500,13 +500,14 @@ session policy lives.
   unmarked reply into a *dropped* one, because an unappliable marking stops the
   send. Verify a platform before extending that list.
 - A genuinely dual-stack `[::]` listener still emits **unmarked** IPv4-mapped
-  replies, and this is known. It is not fixed by choosing the option per reply,
+  replies on Linux. When reply DSCP/traffic-class marking for IPv4 peers
-  for the macOS reason above, and it predates wildcard source selection. Leave it
+  matters, configure the normal same-port `[::]:PORT` plus `0.0.0.0:PORT`
-  until it is worth its own slice, and do not "fix" it by weakening the rule that
+  listener pair instead; `ServerSet` makes the IPv6 half IPv6-only for that
-  an unappliable marking stops the send. The crate forbids unsafe code;
+  pair. Do not force `IPV6_V6ONLY` on every lone IPv6 listener, and do not
-  there is no raw `setsockopt` and no `sendmsg`/`cmsg` machinery. Keep the
+  weaken the rule that an unappliable marking stops the send. The crate forbids
-  target lists identical to the pinned `socket2` version's own gates — check
+  unsafe code; there is no raw `setsockopt` and no `sendmsg`/`cmsg` machinery.
-  its source rather than copying another crate's older matrix.
+  Keep the target lists identical to the pinned `socket2` version's own gates
+  — check its source rather than copying another crate's older matrix.
 
 ## Rate, lifetime and server-initiated close
 

crates/irtt-server/src/set.rs

@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ impl ServerSet {
     /// An IPv4-mapped address such as `[::ffff:0.0.0.0]` is an IPv4 listener
     /// here, not an IPv6 one, matching how the runtime already reads it.
     ///
+    /// A lone explicit dual-stack `[::]:PORT` listener is not the recommended
+    /// configuration when reply DSCP/traffic-class marking for IPv4 peers
+    /// matters: Linux serves those peers as IPv4-mapped and cannot retain the
+    /// negotiated marking on their replies. Request the normal same-port
+    /// `[::]:PORT` and `0.0.0.0:PORT` pair instead. This method makes the IPv6
+    /// half IPv6-only for that pair only; a lone IPv6 listener retains its
+    /// normal socket behavior.
+    ///
     /// # Errors
     ///
     /// Returns [`ServerSetError::NoListeners`] if `addrs` is empty — a set

docs/irtt-rs.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The build also produces dedicated binaries: `irtt-client`, `irtt-tui`, and
 what it is invoked or copied as — it does not consult argv0 dispatch logic.
 
 `irtt-rs` itself inspects argv0 first: if invoked (or symlinked/copied) under
-one of the recognized applet names — `irtt-client`, `irtt-tui`, `irttd`, or
+one of the recognized applet names — `irtt-client`, `irtt-tui`, or
 `irtt-server` — it runs that applet directly, without needing a subcommand.
 Any other name starting with `irtt-` (other than `irtt-rs` itself) is
 rejected as an unknown applet name before subcommand parsing is even

docs/irtt-server.md

@@ -60,7 +60,17 @@ served.
 A port of `0` selects an unused port per listener, so two such binds get two
 different ports.
 
-With no `--bind` at all, see [Default bind](#default-bind) above.
+With no `--bind` at all, see [Description](#description) above for the
+default wildcard pair and the address-family fallback it allows.
+
+When reply DSCP/traffic-class marking for IPv4 peers matters, do not configure
+one explicit dual-stack `[::]:PORT` listener by itself. On Linux, IPv4 peers
+served through that socket are IPv4-mapped and their replies cannot retain the
+negotiated marking. Configure the ordinary paired `[::]:PORT` and
+`0.0.0.0:PORT` listeners instead; the IPv6 listener is made IPv6-only for that
+same-port pair, so each family uses the correct socket option. This is a
+configuration workaround, not a reason to force `IPV6_V6ONLY` for every lone
+IPv6 listener.
 
 ### `--hmac KEY`
 
@@ -136,6 +146,35 @@ and they are sent unmarked. The session is not refused.
 Durations everywhere in this command accept an integer followed by a unit:
 `ms`, `s`, or `m`.
 
+## ENVIRONMENT
+
+Every option above can also be supplied through an environment variable, for
+deployments that configure by environment rather than by command line
+(containers, orchestrators, unit files). A flag given on the command line
+overrides the corresponding variable entirely; an unset variable leaves the
+built-in default in place.
+
+| Variable | Option |
+| --- | --- |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_BIND` | `--bind`, one address only |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_HMAC` | `--hmac` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_MAX_SESSIONS` | `--max-sessions` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH` | `--max-packet-length` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_MIN_INTERVAL` | `--min-interval` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_BURST` | `--burst` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | `--idle-timeout` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_MAX_DURATION` | `--max-duration` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_TIMESTAMP_ALLOWANCE` | `--timestamp-allowance` |
+| `IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP` | `--no-dscp` |
+
+`IRTT_SERVER_BIND` takes exactly one address, the same as a single `--bind`;
+there is no way to request several listeners from the environment. Serving
+more than one address needs repeated `--bind` options.
+
+`IRTT_SERVER_NO_DSCP` is the only boolean. `0`, `false`, `no`, `n`, `off` and
+an empty value leave traffic-class marking enabled; any other value disables
+it, and an unset variable leaves it enabled.
+
 ## OUTPUT
 
 Each bound endpoint is printed on startup, once every listener is up, which

docs/irtt-tui.md

@@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ presentation bounds on top of the client's own statistics retention (see
 total memory is dominated by whichever of the two is larger for your target
 count.
 
+A **finite** `--duration` TUI run retains exact statistics samples exactly as
+`irtt-client(1)` does in finite mode, so its retained state grows with the
+probe count rather than approaching a bound. Unlike `irtt-client`, the TUI
+prints **no** memory warning when that estimate gets large: it owns the
+alternate screen, and a stderr warning there would be invisible or would
+corrupt the display. Size a long finite TUI run from the figures in
+`irtt-client(1)` MEASUREMENTS AND MEMORY, or use the continuous default.
+
 ## EXIT BEHAVIOR
 
 Quitting with `q` or `Ctrl-C` is an interrupted, successful exit. Otherwise,

fuzz/Cargo.lock

@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ version = "1.4.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c3d036a3c4ab069c7b410a2ce876bd74808d2d0888a82667669f8e783a898bf1"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "autocfg"
+version = "1.5.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f2032f911046de80f0a198e0901378627c33f59ea0ac00e363d481118bd70a53"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "bitflags"
+version = "2.13.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "3ded4057c258ba199e2d26386d3af3780957ecaee6c4ef4041c6b4b8b97c0b06"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "block-buffer"
 version = "0.12.1"
@@ -35,6 +47,12 @@ version = "1.0.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "9330f8b2ff13f34540b44e946ef35111825727b38d33286ef986142615121801"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "cfg_aliases"
+version = "0.2.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f079e83a288787bcd14a6aea84cee5c87a67c5a3e660c30f557a3d24761b3527"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "cmov"
 version = "0.5.4"
@@ -126,10 +144,24 @@ dependencies = [
 name = "irtt-proto-fuzz"
 version = "0.0.0"
 dependencies = [
+ "arbitrary",
  "irtt-proto",
+ "irtt-server",
  "libfuzzer-sys",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "irtt-server"
+version = "0.5.2"
+dependencies = [
+ "getrandom",
+ "irtt-proto",
+ "nix",
+ "socket2",
+ "thiserror",
+ "tokio",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "jobserver"
 version = "0.1.35"
@@ -166,6 +198,45 @@ dependencies = [
  "digest",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "memoffset"
+version = "0.9.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "488016bfae457b036d996092f6cb448677611ce4449e970ceaf42695203f218a"
+dependencies = [
+ "autocfg",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "mio"
+version = "1.2.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4b18443e9c262bfe8fa82f51666e2642c53393f7e5c27b3e1aeab922cff5b9d8"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "wasi",
+ "windows-sys",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "nix"
+version = "0.31.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "cf20d2fde8ff38632c426f1165ed7436270b44f199fc55284c38276f9db47c3d"
+dependencies = [
+ "bitflags",
+ "cfg-if",
+ "cfg_aliases",
+ "libc",
+ "memoffset",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "pin-project-lite"
+version = "0.2.17"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a89322df9ebe1c1578d689c92318e070967d1042b512afbe49518723f4e6d5cd"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "proc-macro2"
 version = "1.0.107"
@@ -196,6 +267,16 @@ version = "2.0.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "f8fadd59c855ef2080decdef8ff161eb6661b86933c9d82e5ba29dc602a55aba"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "socket2"
+version = "0.6.5"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c3d1e2c7f27f8d4cb10542a02c49005dbd6e93095799d6f3be745fae9f8fedd4"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "windows-sys",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "subtle"
 version = "2.6.1"
@@ -233,6 +314,31 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "tokio"
+version = "1.53.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "202caea871b69668250d242070849eb495be178ed697a3e98aebce5bc81a0bed"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "mio",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "socket2",
+ "tokio-macros",
+ "windows-sys",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tokio-macros"
+version = "2.7.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "78773a2a397f451582ce068015985c33193cf6dea8b74d2a639fe457b2f07b0e"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "typenum"
 version = "1.20.1"
@@ -244,3 +350,24 @@ name = "unicode-ident"
 version = "1.0.24"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e6e4313cd5fcd3dad5cafa179702e2b244f760991f45397d14d4ebf38247da75"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "wasi"
+version = "0.11.1+wasi-snapshot-preview1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ccf3ec651a847eb01de73ccad15eb7d99f80485de043efb2f370cd654f4ea44b"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "windows-link"
+version = "0.2.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f0805222e57f7521d6a62e36fa9163bc891acd422f971defe97d64e70d0a4fe5"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "windows-sys"
+version = "0.61.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ae137229bcbd6cdf0f7b80a31df61766145077ddf49416a728b02cb3921ff3fc"
+dependencies = [
+ "windows-link",
+]

fuzz/Cargo.toml

@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@ edition = "2021"
 cargo-fuzz = true
 
 [dependencies]
+arbitrary = "1.4.2"
 libfuzzer-sys = "0.4.13"
 
 [dependencies.irtt-proto]
 path = "../crates/irtt-proto"
 
+[dependencies.irtt-server]
+path = "../crates/irtt-server"
+
 # Use independent workspace for fuzzers
 [workspace]
 members = ["."]
@@ -51,3 +55,10 @@ path = "fuzz_targets/decode_varint.rs"
 test = false
 doc = false
 bench = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "server_core_datagrams"
+path = "fuzz_targets/server_core_datagrams.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+bench = false

fuzz/README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-# `irtt-proto` fuzzing
+# `irtt-rs` fuzzing
 
-Coverage-guided fuzzing of `irtt-proto`'s wire decoders via
+Coverage-guided fuzzing of `irtt-proto` wire decoders and `irtt-server`'s public
+`ServerCore::handle_datagram` API via
 [`cargo-fuzz`](https://github.com/rust-fuzz/cargo-fuzz)/libFuzzer.
 
 This project is intentionally isolated from the normal stable/MSRV
@@ -22,14 +23,16 @@ of the root workspace, requires nightly Rust, and is not built by
 | `decode_echo_reply` | `decode_echo_reply` against a deterministic, bounded `Params` matrix, unauthenticated and HMAC-authenticated |
 | `decode_params`     | `Params::decode` and `Params::decode_with_presence`, plus an encode/decode round trip |
 | `decode_varint`     | `varint::decode_uvarint`/`decode_varint` and their round trip through `encode_uvarint`/`encode_varint` |
+| `server_core_datagrams` | A bounded mix of raw datagrams and production-encoded Open/Echo/Close requests against one `ServerCore`; it varies IPv4/IPv6 peers, session configuration, and bounded (up to 128-byte) HMAC keys, authenticates keyed requests, reuses issued tokens, and asserts the session cap |
 
 The invariant every target asserts is: **arbitrary bytes must never panic**.
 Returning `Err` is normal and expected; a successful decode is also normal.
 
-Every target bounds its input to 128 KiB (`MAX_INPUT_LEN` in each harness) so
+Every target bounds its input (`MAX_INPUT_LEN` in each harness) so libFuzzer
-libFuzzer spends its time exploring protocol structure rather than
+spends its time exploring protocol structure rather than allocating/copying
-allocating/copying megabytes — production IRTT datagrams are UDP-sized, well
+megabytes. `server_core_datagrams` additionally caps its sequence length and
-under this bound.
+each individual datagram and configures the core to the same packet cap, so one
+libFuzzer input cannot become a tiny DoS benchmark.
 
 ## Running
 

fuzz/fuzz_targets/server_core_datagrams.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+#![no_main]
+
+use std::{
+    net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr},
+    time::Duration,
+};
+
+use arbitrary::Unstructured;
+use irtt_proto::{decode_open_reply, encode_request, Params, RequestToEncode};
+use irtt_server::{ServerConfig, ServerCore};
+use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
+
+/// Bounds one libFuzzer input as well as the work it can ask the core to do.
+/// These are deliberately much smaller than a production UDP payload: the
+/// target is stateful parser/session exploration, not packet-size throughput.
+const MAX_INPUT_LEN: usize = 32 * 1024;
+const MAX_DATAGRAMS: usize = 16;
+const MAX_DATAGRAM_LEN: usize = 2 * 1024;
+const MAX_SESSIONS: u8 = 8;
+const MAX_HMAC_KEY_LEN: usize = 128;
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct FuzzSession {
+    token: u64,
+    peer: SocketAddr,
+    params: Params,
+}
+
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+    if data.len() > MAX_INPUT_LEN {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let mut input = Unstructured::new(data);
+    let Ok(mut config) = config(&mut input) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let hmac_key = match input.arbitrary::<bool>() {
+        Ok(true) => {
+            let Ok(length) = input.int_in_range(1..=MAX_HMAC_KEY_LEN) else {
+                return;
+            };
+            input.bytes(length).ok()
+        }
+        Ok(false) => None,
+        Err(_) => return,
+    };
+    if let Some(key) = hmac_key {
+        config = config.with_hmac_key(key);
+    }
+    let mut core = ServerCore::new(config);
+    let mut sessions = Vec::new();
+
+    for _ in 0..MAX_DATAGRAMS {
+        let Ok(operation) = input.arbitrary::<u8>() else {
+            break;
+        };
+
+        match operation % 4 {
+            // Keep arbitrary-byte admission coverage alongside the stateful
+            // production-encoded requests below.
+            0 => raw_datagram(&mut core, &mut input),
+            1 => open_session(&mut core, &mut input, hmac_key, &mut sessions),
+            2 => echo_session(&mut core, &mut input, hmac_key, &sessions),
+            _ => close_session(&mut core, &mut input, hmac_key, &mut sessions),
+        }
+
+        // Arbitrary network input is expected to be rejected or to produce an
+        // internal error in exceptional host conditions. It must never panic,
+        // and it may never grow the bounded table past its configured cap.
+        assert!(core.session_count() <= core.config().max_sessions());
+    }
+});
+
+fn config(input: &mut Unstructured<'_>) -> arbitrary::Result<ServerConfig> {
+    let max_sessions = usize::from(input.int_in_range(0..=MAX_SESSIONS)?);
+    Ok(ServerConfig::default()
+        .with_max_sessions(max_sessions)
+        .with_max_packet_length(MAX_DATAGRAM_LEN)
+        .with_min_send_interval(Duration::ZERO))
+}
+
+fn raw_datagram(core: &mut ServerCore, input: &mut Unstructured<'_>) {
+    let (Ok(peer), Ok(length)) = (peer(input), input.int_in_range(0..=MAX_DATAGRAM_LEN)) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let Ok(packet) = input.bytes(length) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let _ = core.handle_datagram(peer, packet);
+}
+
+fn open_session(
+    core: &mut ServerCore,
+    input: &mut Unstructured<'_>,
+    hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>,
+    sessions: &mut Vec<FuzzSession>,
+) {
+    let Ok(peer) = peer(input) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let params = session_params();
+    let request = encode_request(
+        RequestToEncode::Open {
+            params: &params,
+            no_test: false,
+        },
+        hmac_key,
+    )
+    .expect("fixed valid fuzz open must encode");
+    let Ok(Some(reply)) = core.handle_datagram(peer, &request) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let Ok(reply) = decode_open_reply(reply.bytes(), hmac_key) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    sessions.push(FuzzSession {
+        token: reply.token,
+        peer,
+        params: reply.params,
+    });
+}
+
+fn echo_session(
+    core: &mut ServerCore,
+    input: &mut Unstructured<'_>,
+    hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>,
+    sessions: &[FuzzSession],
+) {
+    let Some(session) =
+        sessions.get(usize::from(input.arbitrary::<u8>().unwrap_or(0)) % sessions.len().max(1))
+    else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let sequence = input.arbitrary().unwrap_or_default();
+    let request = encode_request(
+        RequestToEncode::Echo {
+            token: session.token,
+            sequence,
+            params: &session.params,
+            payload: &[],
+        },
+        hmac_key,
+    )
+    .expect("fixed valid fuzz echo must encode");
+    let _ = core.handle_datagram(session.peer, &request);
+}
+
+fn close_session(
+    core: &mut ServerCore,
+    input: &mut Unstructured<'_>,
+    hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>,
+    sessions: &mut Vec<FuzzSession>,
+) {
+    let index = usize::from(input.arbitrary::<u8>().unwrap_or(0)) % sessions.len().max(1);
+    let Some(session) = sessions.get(index) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let request = encode_request(
+        RequestToEncode::Close {
+            token: session.token,
+        },
+        hmac_key,
+    )
+    .expect("fixed valid fuzz close must encode");
+    let _ = core.handle_datagram(session.peer, &request);
+    sessions.swap_remove(index);
+}
+
+fn session_params() -> Params {
+    Params {
+        protocol_version: 1,
+        length: 256,
+        ..Params::default()
+    }
+}
+
+fn peer(input: &mut Unstructured<'_>) -> arbitrary::Result<SocketAddr> {
+    let port = input.arbitrary()?;
+    let address = if input.arbitrary()? {
+        IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(input.arbitrary::<[u8; 4]>()?))
+    } else {
+        IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from(input.arbitrary::<[u8; 16]>()?))
+    };
+    Ok(SocketAddr::new(address, port))
+}