Group control and construction, target lifecycle, target-set transactions,
send pacing and commitment, and bounded timeout processing into private
children of the existing task owner. Keep durable status, outcome history,
top-level polling, sealing, and abandonment in task.rs.
Preserve phase-owned resources, stop/update synchronization, publication
ordering, pacing, and timeout fairness. Move the existing private gate and
timeout tests with their implementation without adding coverage or hooks.
Expose the negotiated schedule end only while the schedule is unfinished,
and include it among Active targets' non-send deadlines. This keeps finite
expiry independent of socket writability and of Burst/Staggered pacing.
Staggered release gating continues to apply only to send opportunities.
The existing expiry path marks the schedule finished, removing its lifetime
deadline before pending probes continue draining. No new state, readiness
handling, cadence, or drain/close policy is introduced. Continuous schedules
have no lifetime deadline.
The prior public-API Linux namespace/veth/TBF investigation observed genuine
EAGAIN with Burst pacing, 500 ms duration, 1 ms interval, 1400-byte probes,
and 20 ms probe timeout. Polling stopped around 327 ms after pending probes
disappeared, remained stalled beyond 1.5 s, and resumed on queue release.
Staggered applicability follows from the shared deadline selection; it was
not separately reproduced under TBF.
Retain two deterministic owning-layer tests for schedule deadline lifetime
and managed selection under send_waiting and stagger gating, using ordinary
Instant values and a production socket. Keep the privileged networking
harness as investigation evidence rather than adding bespoke test machinery.
Validation: formatting; focused schedule/managed tests; managed lifecycle,
behavior, and blocking-owner integration tests; workspace all-feature check,
all-target tests, doctests, and strict Clippy; client no-default-features
check/tests/strict Clippy and Tokio-free normal dependency tree; Linux
all-feature client and integration suites, including ancillary transport.
ManagedClientHandle::update_targets() had a one-line rustdoc that
didn't say targets is a full desired-set replacement, that an
unchanged live target continues undisturbed, or that a changed
config or a terminal-generation resubmission starts a fresh
generation even for byte-identical config.
Moves the client userspace probe sent_at measurement to immediately
after a successful UDP send, improving raw RTT and the userspace
upstream-OWD fallback by excluding the socket send-call interval and
the small amount of local work preceding it.
All fallible probe-commit preflight (timeout deadline checked_add,
capacity/collision checks) still runs before the send, from a private
pre-send anchor (SessionMachine::finalize_probe_commit). The public
sent_at is now supplied afterward to an infallible
SessionMachine::commit_probe_sent, so DurationOverflow still guarantees
nothing was transmitted and a WouldBlock try_send still commits
nothing.
The operational probe timeout deadline stays anchored to the pre-send
timestamp on purpose, not to the new post-send sent_at, preserving
existing timeout/loss timing. Linux kernel TX_SOFTWARE plausibility
keeps its own pre-send wall-clock lower bound
(PendingProbe::tx_not_before_wall) instead of the post-send sent_at,
since a legitimate TX_SOFTWARE timestamp can be generated while the
send syscall is still in flight and would otherwise be wrongly
rejected.
Also flags (without touching production code) that irtt-stats'
ReplySample::from_reply_parts feeds the public sent_at directly into
IpdvSample.client_send_mono/client_send_wall_ns, so the upstream/send
IPDV component naturally shifts along with the sent_at semantics
change; per scope this is reported rather than compensated for.
On Linux, best-effort upgrade the socket's SO_TIMESTAMPING flags to
TX_SOFTWARE | OPT_ID | OPT_TSONLY after a successful Open and before the
first Echo probe. Promote the #103 error-queue foundation to production:
MSG_ERRQUEUE is drained opportunistically with a fixed per-call budget at
several natural choke points (after a probe send, before processing a
reply, before evaluating timeouts), and each automatic OPT_ID timestamp is
correlated directly with wire_seq — safe because Linux rolls back its
speculative sk_tskey increment on every send failure, wire_seq and the
kernel counter start together at every Open, and a socket can never be
reopened for a second session. The observed kernel TX wall timestamp is
retained on PendingProbe (surviving pending -> timed-out retention) as
dormant metadata only; RTT, OWD, and IPDV are unchanged and continue to use
the userspace send timestamp exclusively. Capability failure is fully
non-fatal and RX timestamping is unaffected either way. Non-Linux and
non-ancillary builds are unchanged.
The counter tests instantiated the private TargetCounters and mirrored its
match arms, duplicating outcome-level coverage that already asserts
replies_received and late through ManagedTargetOutcome, and coupling a
private refactor to persistent test churn.
The new counter documentation also defined late replies in timeout-only
terms. A reply that arrives behind an already-received sequence is
classified late by process_echo_reply even when its own probe has not timed
out, so both counters are now described in terms of order and timeout.
The removed test only checked that every failure kind appeared somewhere in
the same hand-maintained case table the mapping test already walks. It could
not prove exhaustiveness or the absence of a fallback, which the compiler
enforces, and it pinned the incidental fact that each category currently has
an input.
Target-local accounting was spread across the managed driver: the event
counter increments were inline in publish_client_events, the authoritative
packets_sent was copied from the client at fifteen separate call sites, and
ManagedTargetOutcome was constructed twice from the same six fields.
TargetCounters::observe now owns the per-event accounting,
TargetRuntime::sync_packets_sent/record_packets_sent own the authoritative
sent count, and TargetRuntime::outcome owns outcome construction, replacing
the free target_outcome function and the inline copy in finish_target. No
counter is touched outside TargetRuntime any more.
The replies_received semantics are unchanged and now documented on both the
private counter and the public outcome field: on-time unique echo replies
only, with late unique replies counted by late. observe matches ClientEvent
exhaustively, so a new event variant must be classified deliberately.
classify_client_error now matches every ClientError variant explicitly, so a
new variant fails to compile here until its real classification is chosen.
NoTokioRuntime classifies as InvalidState and DatagramLengthMismatch as
Socket; ManagedTargetFailureKind::Other survives only as a deliberate
category with no default path into it.
ManagedTargetFailurePhase and ManagedTargetFailureKind gain controlled
Display impls, and the CLI client/TUI failure diagnostics use them instead
of leaking Debug enum spelling into user-facing text.
Replace the three per-kind request encoders and decoders with one
directional pair, ahead of introducing irtt-server.
Sender side: encode_request(RequestToEncode, hmac_key) constructs OPEN,
CLOSE and ECHO requests from borrowed values. Params and the ECHO payload
are borrowed rather than owned, removing a Params clone and a payload Vec
from the client's hot paths. Wire output is byte-identical; all captured
vectors still pass unchanged.
Receiver side: decode_request(packet) structurally classifies an inbound
request with no HMAC key, no negotiated Params, no session state and no
allocation. A server must extract a token before it knows which key
applies, so authentication is a separate step. Classification follows the
verified server spec: reserved bits and FLAG_REPLY are rejected, OPEN
takes precedence over CLOSE and over an echo-shaped body, and only the
structural minimums (4/12/16, plus 16 with FLAG_HMAC) are enforced.
Trailing bytes are tolerated, no negotiated length ceiling is applied, and
a zero token is structurally valid. OPEN parameters stay encoded bytes so
an authenticating receiver can verify before decoding untrusted data, and
everything after an ECHO sequence number is exposed as an opaque tail.
Add verify_packet_hmac(key, packet), which locates the standard field
itself and rejects a packet lacking FLAG_HMAC. hmac_present reports packet
layout, never authentication. The offset-based verify_hmac stays public as
the low-level primitive for hand-built and captured wire vectors, matching
the existing compute_hmac pair.
Refactor the private envelope into structural header decoding, codec flag
rules, HMAC presence policy and verification as separate steps. The reply
codecs compose the same steps in the same order, so decode_open_reply and
decode_echo_reply keep their exact error ordering and the client's
fatal-versus-ignore classification is unchanged. Reply decoding stays
state-specific: the client already knows which reply to expect, and the
two need different semantic context.
Migrate the production client and every fake peer to the new API; the
fake peers now admit requests the way a server does, instead of parsing
packets by hand.
Nils Andreas Svee