feat(server): handle client close

Release the session a client close names. A close is bound to a session only
when the token matches and the datagram arrived from that session's exact
endpoint, so holding a token is not by itself authority to tear the session
down: a close from a foreign source port, address, family or IPv6 scope leaves
the session live, and one close cannot take down a sibling session the same
peer opened separately. A token that is unknown, already closed or zero matches
nothing and leaves the table untouched; zero is reserved for no-test replies and
never issued.

Nothing is sent either way. Protocol version 1 defines no acknowledgement for a
client close, so a successful close returns the same `Ok(None)` as a rejected
one and a delivered close is indistinguishable to the client from a lost one.
A standalone `Reply|Close` datagram is tolerated by clients but has no
demonstrated use, so none is encoded.

Authentication still runs before the session is looked up. That keeps a bad MAC
on a live token indistinguishable from an unknown token, and means a close that
fails authentication — missing, wrongly keyed, corrupted, or unexpected on a
server with no key — cannot remove a session. Trailing bytes after the token
stay acceptable: the structural decoder already tolerates them and the server
does not re-parse the request.

The session table remains the only record of how full the server is, so a close
frees capacity immediately and a refused open can succeed once one is released.
Close draws no token and touches no other state; the endpoint lookup borrows
the table only until the comparison is made, so the removal needs no clone.

Echo remains ignored. The test that pinned close as a no-op is replaced by
`tests/close.rs`, which covers removal, silence, repeated close, echo after
close, endpoint binding, unknown/zero/stale tokens, authentication failure,
trailing bytes, sibling sessions and capacity reuse; `unsupported.rs` keeps
echo and structurally invalid traffic.
This commit is contained in:
Nils Andreas Svee committed 2026-08-12 10:30:50 +07:00
1 parent be66a6a61d
commit d269f77c87
8 files changed
+380 -54

No files matched your search

+41 -13
View File
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ use crate::{
///
/// # Scope
///
/// This slice implements open handling and session creation. Echo and close
/// requests are structurally recognized and then deliberately ignored — no
/// reply, no session mutation — until their own slices.
/// This slice implements open handling, session creation and client-initiated
/// close. Echo requests are structurally recognized and then deliberately
/// ignored — no reply, no session mutation — until their own slice.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ServerCore {
config: ServerConfig,
@@ -81,11 +81,8 @@ impl ServerCore {
///
/// This is a lookup by token alone and is therefore *not* an admission
/// check: a request is bound to a session only when the token matches and
/// it arrived from the session's exact endpoint.
//
// Called only by tests until echo and close processing arrive, which is
// what a token lookup is for.
#[allow(dead_code)]
/// it arrived from the session's exact endpoint. Callers pair it with an
/// endpoint comparison, as close handling does.
pub(crate) fn session(&self, token: u64) -> Option<&Session> {
self.sessions.get(&token)
}
@@ -101,6 +98,10 @@ impl ServerCore {
/// payload, would exceed the session bound, or is a request kind this slice
/// does not implement. None of that mutates any live session.
///
/// `Ok(None)` is not only a rejection, though. A close request that does
/// release its session is answered with nothing as well, because protocol
/// version 1 defines no acknowledgement for one.
///
/// Authentication is checked before open parameters are decoded. That
/// ordering is deliberate: a packet that fails authentication is discarded
/// without parsing untrusted parameter data, and no reply behavior may
@@ -133,11 +134,14 @@ impl ServerCore {
match request.kind {
DecodedRequestKind::Open { no_test, params } => self.handle_open(peer, no_test, params),
// Not implemented in this slice. A close must not remove a session
// and an echo must not advance receive state until the slices that
// implement those behaviors; emitting a placeholder reply now would
// be worse than silence.
DecodedRequestKind::Close { .. } | DecodedRequestKind::Echo { .. } => Ok(None),
DecodedRequestKind::Close { token } => {
self.handle_close(peer, token);
Ok(None)
}
// Not implemented in this slice. An echo must not advance receive
// state until the slice that implements it; emitting a placeholder
// reply now would be worse than silence.
DecodedRequestKind::Echo { .. } => Ok(None),
}
}
@@ -191,6 +195,30 @@ impl ServerCore {
Ok(Some(packet))
}
/// Releases the session a close request names, if that request owns one.
///
/// A close is bound to a session only when the token matches *and* the
/// datagram arrived from that session's exact endpoint, so holding a token
/// is not by itself authority to tear the session down: a close from a
/// foreign endpoint leaves it live, and one close cannot take down a
/// sibling session that the same peer opened separately. A token that is
/// unknown, already closed, or zero — zero is reserved for no-test replies
/// and never issued — matches nothing and leaves the table untouched.
///
/// Nothing is sent either way, which is why this returns no reply to
/// encode. Protocol version 1 defines no acknowledgement for a client
/// close, so a delivered close is indistinguishable to the client from a
/// lost one, and the freed capacity is immediately reusable because the
/// session table is the only record of it.
fn handle_close(&mut self, peer: SocketAddr, token: u64) {
let owns_session = self
.session(token)
.is_some_and(|session| session.peer() == peer);
if owns_session {
self.sessions.remove(&token);
}
}
/// Encodes a reply this server constructed. Any failure here is internal.
fn encode_reply(&self, reply: &OpenReply) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError> {
encode_open_reply(reply, self.config.hmac_key())