feat(server): implement echo core

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Nils Andreas Svee committed 2026-08-12 23:21:02 +07:00
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@@ -103,9 +103,43 @@ effective parameters must be safe for the server to run.
- Zero is a valid maximum and is not a synonym for unlimited: it refuses every
session, and no-test opens with it, since both are validated against the same
effective session.
- The echo slice must reuse this same configured maximum to admit inbound echo
request datagrams by their received length, before any receive state is
mutated.
- Echo request admission reuses this same configured maximum, comparing it
against the received datagram length before any receive state is mutated.
## Echo processing
- An accepted echo owns per-session `ReceiveState` — count, window and the
previous accepted sequence number. Admission order is authentication, then
received datagram length against the configured maximum, then token, then
endpoint; a request failing any of them mutates nothing, in this session or
any other.
- The count and window transitions follow the clean specification's Section 10
and the Section 1 vectors, including the parts that read as defects: a
duplicate advances the count and leaves the window alone, and a late,
reordered or far-gap request resets the window to `0x1` rather than setting a
historical bit, because the distance is unsigned. Do not replace this with a
conventional selective-acknowledgement bitmap. Reference the vectors rather
than restating the tables here.
- Only the token and sequence number mean anything in a request. The tail is
opaque, and the request's length never sizes the reply — layout and length
come from the session's negotiated params through `irtt-proto` alone.
- The transition is pure and is committed only after the reply has encoded, so
an internal encoding failure cannot leave a session claiming to have answered
a request it never did.
- Clock sampling is a private injected seam, like token generation, not a
runtime abstraction: the receive instant is taken as soon as a datagram is
classified as an echo and the send instant just before the reply is built, so
they bracket the server's own handling. The monotonic origin belongs to the
clock source and is stable for its life.
- For a single-clock midpoint, `irtt-rs` emits the one negotiated field. It does
not reproduce upstream 0.9.1's dual-field midpoint; `irtt-proto` still decodes
that form from a peer.
- Reply payload bytes are zero, which is the initial safe fill policy: payload
carries no protocol meaning, and a server must never emit residue from another
request or client. Request payload bytes never reach a reply.
- Rate limiting, idle expiry, maximum duration, server-initiated close, DSCP
socket application and the full `ServerFill` policy are later slices. Do not
add placeholder session fields for them.
## Resource policy
@@ -130,9 +164,10 @@ half-created session.
maintain shadow encoders for well-formed wire data.
- Hand-build packets only where the point is a payload a compliant encoder
cannot produce — truncated varints, out-of-range enums, corrupted MACs.
- Token generation is the only nondeterministic part; tests inject a scripted
source so identity, collisions and allocation failure are assertable. Keep
that seam private.
- Token generation and clock sampling are the only nondeterministic parts; tests
inject a scripted source for each, so identity, collisions, allocation failure
and timestamp values are all assertable. Keep both seams private, and keep
timestamp tests free of sleeps, tolerances and real wall-clock assertions.
- As the server gains behavior, prefer it over fake peers for normal compliant
behavior in other crates' tests. Keep small raw/adversarial peers for
intentionally malformed or non-compliant wire behavior.