test: protect durable behavior identified in review

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Nils Andreas Svee committed 2026-10-02 16:12:52 +07:00
1 parent e115b96f21
commit 83b3607228
7 files changed
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@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
use std::{net::SocketAddr, time::Duration};
use std::{
net::{SocketAddr, SocketAddrV6},
time::Duration,
};
use irtt_proto::{decode_echo_reply, decode_open_reply, encode_request, Params, RequestToEncode};
use irtt_server::{ServerConfig, ServerCore};
@@ -116,3 +119,143 @@ fn zero_burst_and_zero_idle_timeout_silently_refuse_echoes() {
assert!(server.handle_datagram(peer, &echo).unwrap().is_none());
}
}
#[test]
fn ipv6_flow_labels_share_a_session_but_zones_do_not() {
let endpoint = |flow, scope| {
SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(
"fe80::1234".parse().unwrap(),
40000,
flow,
scope,
))
};
let mut server =
ServerCore::new(ServerConfig::default().with_min_send_interval(Duration::ZERO));
let params = Params {
received_stats: irtt_proto::ReceivedStats::Both,
..Params::with_protocol_defaults()
};
let packet = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Open {
params: &params,
no_test: false,
},
None,
)
.unwrap();
let reply = server
.handle_datagram(endpoint(1, 2), &packet)
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
let opened = decode_open_reply(reply.bytes(), None).unwrap();
let echo = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Echo {
token: opened.token,
sequence: 0,
params: &opened.params,
payload: &[],
},
None,
)
.unwrap();
let close = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Close {
token: opened.token,
},
None,
)
.unwrap();
assert!(server
.handle_datagram(endpoint(1, 3), &echo)
.unwrap()
.is_none());
assert!(server
.handle_datagram(endpoint(1, 3), &close)
.unwrap()
.is_none());
assert_eq!(server.session_count(), 1);
let reply = server
.handle_datagram(endpoint(99, 2), &echo)
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
decode_echo_reply(reply.bytes(), &opened.params, None)
.unwrap()
.recv_count,
Some(1)
);
assert!(server
.handle_datagram(endpoint(99, 2), &close)
.unwrap()
.is_none());
assert_eq!(server.session_count(), 0);
}
#[test]
fn oversized_authenticated_echo_does_not_advance_session_state() {
let key = b"oversized-echo-test";
let peer = "127.0.0.1:40000".parse().unwrap();
let mut server = ServerCore::new(
ServerConfig::default()
.with_hmac_key(key)
.with_max_packet_length(96)
.with_burst_allowance(1)
.with_min_send_interval(Duration::from_secs(60))
.with_max_test_duration(Duration::from_millis(1))
.with_idle_timeout(Duration::MAX),
);
let params = Params {
length: 96,
received_stats: irtt_proto::ReceivedStats::Both,
..Params::with_protocol_defaults()
};
let open = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Open {
params: &params,
no_test: false,
},
Some(key),
)
.unwrap();
let reply = server.handle_datagram(peer, &open).unwrap().unwrap();
let opened = decode_open_reply(reply.bytes(), Some(key)).unwrap();
let oversized_params = Params {
length: 128,
..opened.params.clone()
};
let oversized = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Echo {
token: opened.token,
sequence: 63,
params: &oversized_params,
payload: &[],
},
Some(key),
)
.unwrap();
assert!(oversized.len() > 96);
assert!(server.handle_datagram(peer, &oversized).unwrap().is_none());
// If the oversized request started maximum duration, the first valid
// echo would now close. Oversleep preserves this distinction.
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(2001));
let valid = encode_request(
RequestToEncode::Echo {
token: opened.token,
sequence: 0,
params: &opened.params,
payload: &[],
},
Some(key),
)
.unwrap();
let reply = server
.handle_datagram(peer, &valid)
.unwrap()
.expect("oversized request must not consume allowance");
let reply = decode_echo_reply(reply.bytes(), &opened.params, Some(key)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(reply.flags & irtt_proto::FLAG_CLOSE, 0);
assert_eq!(reply.recv_count, Some(1));
assert_eq!(reply.recv_window, Some(1));
assert_eq!(server.session_count(), 1);
}