test(client): add comprehensive integration tests for HMAC authentication

Verify HMAC negotiation, session closure, and error handling for authenticated probes to ensure protocol security and reliability.
This commit is contained in:
Nils Andreas Svee committed 2026-05-03 23:06:26 +07:00
1 parent 86f16b8656
commit 56b560418c
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@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
mod support;
use std::time::Duration;
use irtt_client::{
Client, ClientConfig, ClientError, ClientEvent, ClientTimestamp, OpenOutcome, SocketConfig,
WarningKind,
};
use irtt_proto::{echo_packet_len, ProtoError, TimestampFields};
use support::{
config_for_params, default_params, params_for_modes, run_one_probe_with_config,
standard_timestamps, start_bad_hmac_echo_reply_server, start_hmac_close_server,
start_hmac_required_open_drop_server, ServerObservation, TOKEN,
};
#[test]
fn hmac_open_success_negotiates_without_warnings() {
let key = b"compat-secret".to_vec();
let params = default_params();
let config_params = params.clone();
let config_key = key.clone();
let run = run_one_probe_with_config(
params.clone(),
TimestampFields::default(),
Some(key),
|addr| ClientConfig {
hmac_key: Some(config_key),
..config_for_params(addr, &config_params)
},
);
assert_eq!(run.negotiated.params, params);
match &run.observations[0] {
ServerObservation::Open { params: got, hmac } => {
assert_eq!(got, &params);
assert!(*hmac);
}
other => panic!("expected open observation, got {other:?}"),
}
assert_no_warning_or_error(&[run.sent, run.reply]);
}
#[test]
fn hmac_echo_success_verifies_request_and_accepts_reply() {
let key = b"compat-secret".to_vec();
let params = default_params();
let config_params = params.clone();
let config_key = key.clone();
let run = run_one_probe_with_config(params.clone(), standard_timestamps(), Some(key), |addr| {
ClientConfig {
hmac_key: Some(config_key),
..config_for_params(addr, &config_params)
}
});
match &run.observations[1] {
ServerObservation::Echo {
len,
hmac,
token,
sequence,
} => {
assert_eq!(*len, echo_packet_len(true, &params));
assert!(*hmac);
assert_eq!(*token, TOKEN);
assert_eq!(*sequence, 0);
}
other => panic!("expected echo observation, got {other:?}"),
}
match &run.reply {
ClientEvent::EchoReply {
seq,
logical_seq,
bytes,
server_timing,
..
} => {
assert_eq!(*seq, 0);
assert_eq!(*logical_seq, 0);
assert_eq!(*bytes, echo_packet_len(true, &params));
assert!(server_timing.is_some());
}
other => panic!("expected EchoReply, got {other:?}"),
}
assert_no_duplicate_late_or_warning(&[run.reply]);
}
#[test]
fn hmac_close_success_sends_authenticated_close_and_closes_session() {
let key = b"compat-secret".to_vec();
let params = default_params();
let server = start_hmac_close_server(params.clone(), key.clone());
let mut config = config_for_params(server.addr, &params);
config.hmac_key = Some(key);
let mut client = Client::connect(config).unwrap();
let outcome = client.open(ClientTimestamp::now()).unwrap();
assert_started(outcome, &params);
let events = client.close(ClientTimestamp::now()).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
events.as_slice(),
[ClientEvent::SessionClosed { token: TOKEN, .. }]
));
assert!(matches!(
client.send_probe(),
Err(ClientError::AlreadyClosed)
));
let observations = server.observations(2);
match &observations[1] {
ServerObservation::Close { hmac, token } => {
assert!(*hmac);
assert_eq!(*token, TOKEN);
}
other => panic!("expected close observation, got {other:?}"),
}
server.join();
}
#[test]
fn missing_client_key_against_hmac_required_server_times_out() {
let key = b"compat-secret".to_vec();
let server = start_hmac_required_open_drop_server(key, Duration::from_millis(250));
let mut config = config_for_params(server.addr, &default_params());
config.open_timeouts = vec![Duration::from_millis(200)];
config.hmac_key = None;
let mut client = Client::connect(config).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
client.open(ClientTimestamp::now()),
Err(ClientError::OpenTimeout)
));
let observations = server.observations(1);
assert!(matches!(
observations.as_slice(),
[ServerObservation::RejectedHmac {
hmac: false,
bad_hmac: true
}]
));
server.join();
}
#[test]
fn wrong_client_key_against_hmac_required_server_times_out() {
let server_key = b"compat-secret".to_vec();
let server = start_hmac_required_open_drop_server(server_key, Duration::from_millis(250));
let mut config = config_for_params(server.addr, &default_params());
config.open_timeouts = vec![Duration::from_millis(200)];
config.hmac_key = Some(b"wrong-secret".to_vec());
let mut client = Client::connect(config).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
client.open(ClientTimestamp::now()),
Err(ClientError::OpenTimeout)
));
let observations = server.observations(1);
assert!(matches!(
observations.as_slice(),
[ServerObservation::RejectedHmac {
hmac: true,
bad_hmac: true
}]
));
server.join();
}
#[test]
fn bad_hmac_echo_reply_is_rejected_without_echo_reply_event() {
let key = b"compat-secret".to_vec();
let params = default_params();
let server = start_bad_hmac_echo_reply_server(params.clone(), key.clone());
let mut config = config_for_params(server.addr, &params);
config.hmac_key = Some(key);
config.socket_config = SocketConfig {
recv_timeout: Some(Duration::from_millis(500)),
..Default::default()
};
let mut client = Client::connect(config).unwrap();
let outcome = client.open(ClientTimestamp::now()).unwrap();
assert_started(outcome, &params);
let sent = client.send_probe().unwrap();
assert_eq!(sent.len(), 1);
let events = client.recv_once().unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
events.as_slice(),
[ClientEvent::Warning {
kind: WarningKind::MalformedOrUnrelatedPacket,
..
}]
));
assert!(!events
.iter()
.any(|event| matches!(event, ClientEvent::EchoReply { .. })));
let observations = server.observations(2);
assert!(matches!(
observations.as_slice(),
[
ServerObservation::Open { hmac: true, .. },
ServerObservation::Echo {
hmac: true,
token: TOKEN,
sequence: 0,
..
}
]
));
server.join();
}
#[test]
fn hmac_open_reply_with_bad_hmac_fails_with_protocol_error() {
let key = b"compat-secret".to_vec();
let wrong_key = b"wrong-secret".to_vec();
let params = default_params();
let server = support::start_bad_hmac_open_reply_server(params.clone(), key.clone(), wrong_key);
let mut config = config_for_params(server.addr, &params);
config.hmac_key = Some(key);
let mut client = Client::connect(config).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
client.open(ClientTimestamp::now()),
Err(ClientError::Protocol(ProtoError::BadHmac))
));
server.join();
}
#[test]
fn non_hmac_client_open_does_not_set_hmac_flag() {
let params = params_for_modes(
irtt_proto::ReceivedStats::None,
irtt_proto::StampAt::None,
irtt_proto::Clock::Both,
);
let server = support::start_open_server(params.clone(), None);
let mut config = config_for_params(server.addr, &params);
config.hmac_key = None;
let mut client = Client::connect(config).unwrap();
let outcome = client.open(ClientTimestamp::now()).unwrap();
assert_started(outcome, &params);
let observations = server.observations(1);
assert!(matches!(
observations.as_slice(),
[ServerObservation::Open { hmac: false, .. }]
));
server.join();
}
fn assert_started(outcome: OpenOutcome, expected: &irtt_proto::Params) {
match outcome {
OpenOutcome::Started {
token,
negotiated,
event:
ClientEvent::SessionStarted {
token: event_token,
negotiated: event_negotiated,
..
},
..
} => {
assert_eq!(token, TOKEN);
assert_eq!(event_token, TOKEN);
assert_eq!(negotiated.params, *expected);
assert_eq!(event_negotiated.params, *expected);
}
other => panic!("expected started open outcome, got {other:?}"),
}
}
fn assert_no_warning_or_error(events: &[ClientEvent]) {
assert!(!events.iter().any(|event| {
matches!(
event,
ClientEvent::Warning { .. }
| ClientEvent::DuplicateReply { .. }
| ClientEvent::LateReply { .. }
)
}));
}
fn assert_no_duplicate_late_or_warning(events: &[ClientEvent]) {
assert_no_warning_or_error(events);
}
+159 -3
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@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
use std::{ use std::{
net::{SocketAddr, UdpSocket}, net::{SocketAddr, UdpSocket},
sync::mpsc, sync::mpsc,
@@ -9,8 +11,8 @@ use irtt_client::{
Client, ClientConfig, ClientEvent, ClientTimestamp, NegotiatedParams, OpenOutcome, SocketConfig, Client, ClientConfig, ClientEvent, ClientTimestamp, NegotiatedParams, OpenOutcome, SocketConfig,
}; };
use irtt_proto::{ use irtt_proto::{
compute_hmac_in_place, echo_packet_len, flags, verify_hmac, Clock, Params, ReceivedStats, compute_hmac_in_place, echo_packet_len, flags, verify_hmac, Clock, Params, ProtoError,
ServerFill, StampAt, TimestampFields, HMAC_SIZE, MAGIC, PROTOCOL_VERSION, ReceivedStats, ServerFill, StampAt, TimestampFields, HMAC_SIZE, MAGIC, PROTOCOL_VERSION,
}; };
const HMAC_OFFSET: usize = 4; const HMAC_OFFSET: usize = 4;
@@ -40,12 +42,20 @@ pub enum ServerObservation {
params: Params, params: Params,
hmac: bool, hmac: bool,
}, },
RejectedHmac {
hmac: bool,
bad_hmac: bool,
},
Echo { Echo {
len: usize, len: usize,
hmac: bool, hmac: bool,
token: u64, token: u64,
sequence: u32, sequence: u32,
}, },
Close {
hmac: bool,
token: u64,
},
} }
pub struct OneProbeRun { pub struct OneProbeRun {
@@ -168,6 +178,122 @@ pub fn start_open_server(params: Params, hmac_key: Option<Vec<u8>>) -> FakeServe
}) })
} }
pub fn start_hmac_required_open_drop_server(key: Vec<u8>, wait: Duration) -> FakeServer {
start_fake_server(move |socket, tx| {
socket.set_read_timeout(Some(wait)).unwrap();
while let Some(request) = recv_request_timeout(&socket) {
let hmac = request
.get(3)
.is_some_and(|flags| flags & flags::FLAG_HMAC != 0);
match verify_hmac(&key, &request, HMAC_OFFSET) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(error) => {
tx.send(ServerObservation::RejectedHmac {
hmac,
bad_hmac: error == ProtoError::BadHmac,
})
.unwrap();
}
}
}
})
}
pub fn start_hmac_close_server(params: Params, key: Vec<u8>) -> FakeServer {
start_fake_server(move |socket, tx| {
let (request, peer) = recv_request(&socket);
let (open_params, hmac) = decode_open_request_params(&request, Some(&key));
tx.send(ServerObservation::Open {
params: open_params,
hmac,
})
.unwrap();
let reply = open_reply(
flags::FLAG_OPEN | flags::FLAG_REPLY,
TOKEN,
&params,
Some(&key),
);
socket.send_to(&reply, peer).unwrap();
socket
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let (request, peer) = recv_request(&socket);
let close = observe_close_request(&request, &key);
tx.send(close).unwrap();
let reply = close_reply(TOKEN, &key);
socket.send_to(&reply, peer).unwrap();
})
}
pub fn start_bad_hmac_echo_reply_server(params: Params, key: Vec<u8>) -> FakeServer {
start_fake_server(move |socket, tx| {
let (request, peer) = recv_request(&socket);
let (open_params, hmac) = decode_open_request_params(&request, Some(&key));
tx.send(ServerObservation::Open {
params: open_params,
hmac,
})
.unwrap();
let reply = open_reply(
flags::FLAG_OPEN | flags::FLAG_REPLY,
TOKEN,
&params,
Some(&key),
);
socket.send_to(&reply, peer).unwrap();
socket
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let (request, peer) = recv_request(&socket);
let echo = observe_echo_request(&request, Some(&key));
let sequence = match echo {
ServerObservation::Echo { sequence, .. } => sequence,
_ => unreachable!(),
};
tx.send(echo).unwrap();
let mut reply_packet = echo_reply_packet(
TOKEN,
sequence,
&params,
&TimestampFields::default(),
Some(&key),
);
reply_packet[HMAC_OFFSET] ^= 0xff;
socket.send_to(&reply_packet, peer).unwrap();
})
}
pub fn start_bad_hmac_open_reply_server(
params: Params,
request_key: Vec<u8>,
reply_key: Vec<u8>,
) -> FakeServer {
start_fake_server(move |socket, tx| {
let (request, peer) = recv_request(&socket);
let (open_params, hmac) = decode_open_request_params(&request, Some(&request_key));
tx.send(ServerObservation::Open {
params: open_params,
hmac,
})
.unwrap();
let reply = open_reply(
flags::FLAG_OPEN | flags::FLAG_REPLY,
TOKEN,
&params,
Some(&reply_key),
);
socket.send_to(&reply, peer).unwrap();
})
}
pub fn server_fill(value: &str) -> Option<ServerFill> { pub fn server_fill(value: &str) -> Option<ServerFill> {
Some(ServerFill { Some(ServerFill {
value: value.to_owned(), value: value.to_owned(),
@@ -203,7 +329,7 @@ fn start_one_probe_server(
let echo = observe_echo_request(&request, hmac_key.as_deref()); let echo = observe_echo_request(&request, hmac_key.as_deref());
let sequence = match echo { let sequence = match echo {
ServerObservation::Echo { sequence, .. } => sequence, ServerObservation::Echo { sequence, .. } => sequence,
ServerObservation::Open { .. } => unreachable!(), _ => unreachable!(),
}; };
tx.send(echo).unwrap(); tx.send(echo).unwrap();
@@ -231,6 +357,14 @@ fn recv_request(socket: &UdpSocket) -> (Vec<u8>, SocketAddr) {
(buf[..size].to_vec(), peer) (buf[..size].to_vec(), peer)
} }
fn recv_request_timeout(socket: &UdpSocket) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let mut buf = [0_u8; 2048];
match socket.recv_from(&mut buf) {
Ok((size, _)) => Some(buf[..size].to_vec()),
Err(_) => None,
}
}
fn assert_started(outcome: OpenOutcome) -> NegotiatedParams { fn assert_started(outcome: OpenOutcome) -> NegotiatedParams {
match outcome { match outcome {
OpenOutcome::Started { negotiated, .. } => negotiated, OpenOutcome::Started { negotiated, .. } => negotiated,
@@ -274,6 +408,28 @@ fn observe_echo_request(packet: &[u8], hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>) -> ServerObserva
} }
} }
fn observe_close_request(packet: &[u8], hmac_key: &[u8]) -> ServerObservation {
assert_eq!(&packet[..3], &MAGIC);
assert_eq!(packet[3] & flags::FLAG_CLOSE, flags::FLAG_CLOSE);
assert_eq!(packet[3] & flags::FLAG_HMAC, flags::FLAG_HMAC);
verify_hmac(hmac_key, packet, HMAC_OFFSET).unwrap();
let token_offset = 4 + HMAC_SIZE;
let token = u64::from_le_bytes(packet[token_offset..token_offset + 8].try_into().unwrap());
ServerObservation::Close { hmac: true, token }
}
fn close_reply(token: u64, hmac_key: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut packet = Vec::new();
packet.extend_from_slice(&MAGIC);
packet.push(flags::FLAG_REPLY | flags::FLAG_CLOSE | flags::FLAG_HMAC);
packet.extend_from_slice(&[0_u8; HMAC_SIZE]);
packet.extend_from_slice(&token.to_le_bytes());
compute_hmac_in_place(hmac_key, &mut packet, HMAC_OFFSET).unwrap();
packet
}
fn open_reply(flags: u8, token: u64, params: &Params, hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>) -> Vec<u8> { fn open_reply(flags: u8, token: u64, params: &Params, hmac_key: Option<&[u8]>) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut packet = Vec::new(); let mut packet = Vec::new();
packet.extend_from_slice(&MAGIC); packet.extend_from_slice(&MAGIC);