refactor(client): make authentication explicit and redact HMAC keys

This commit is contained in:
Nils Andreas Svee committed 2026-10-04 16:58:44 +07:00
1 parent 9c703ecff2
commit 156db4c720
16 files changed
+184 -119

No files matched your search

+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
use super::*;
use irtt_client::{Authentication, HmacKey};
#[test]
fn hmac_open_ignores_missing_hmac_before_valid_reply() {
let key = b"secret".to_vec();
let mut config = default_test_config(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 1)));
config.hmac_key = Some(key.clone());
config.auth = Authentication::Hmac(HmacKey::new(key.clone()));
let params = default_params();
let server = start_fake_server(move |socket, tx| {
let (_, peer) = recv_request(&socket, &tx);
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ fn hmac_open_ignores_bad_hmac_before_valid_reply() {
let key = b"secret".to_vec();
let wrong_key = b"wrong".to_vec();
let mut config = default_test_config(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 1)));
config.hmac_key = Some(key.clone());
config.auth = Authentication::Hmac(HmacKey::new(key.clone()));
let params = default_params();
let server = start_fake_server(move |socket, tx| {
let (_, peer) = recv_request(&socket, &tx);
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ fn hmac_open_ignores_bad_hmac_before_valid_reply() {
fn post_token_hmac_negotiation_failure_sends_authenticated_cleanup_close() {
let key = b"secret".to_vec();
let mut config = default_test_config(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 1)));
config.hmac_key = Some(key.clone());
config.auth = Authentication::Hmac(HmacKey::new(key.clone()));
let mut returned = default_params();
returned.interval_ns += 1;
let server_key = key.clone();